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MIICHELLE ADAMS*
Percentage plans are currently in use in three of our most populous states. These
plans are admissions plans that rely on a student's class rank to determine
admission to a state college or university. Such plans have been the subject of
much debate and commentary, most of which has centered on the question of
whether percentage plans are an adequate substitute for race-conscious
affirmative action. But to date, few have focused on a reality that lies at the core
of the plans themselves: percentage plans function effectively to diversify higher
education only if secondary education remains firmly racially segregated.
Percentage plans are a reflection of current day educational apartheid,
highlighting the fact that much of our secondary educational system is both
racially segregated and profoundly unequal. When a state attempts to construct
racial diversity at the college and university level out of racial segregation and
inequality at the secondary level, it is obligated to address the educational
disparities throughout the system ofpublic education. Policy proposals designed
to remedy entrenched harms highlighted at the heart of percentage plans are
explored.
I. INTRODUCTION
Racial segregation in education has been one of the most contentious issues
in American race relations, and attempts to dismantle it have likewise been
among the most controversial efforts in our history. Race-conscious,
"preferential" affirmative action programs have been under attack, both in courts
of law and in courts of public opinion, for a variety of reasons.' Against this
backdrop, a trend is emerging: three of the most populous states in the union,
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Research Stipend Program. Thanks to Kathleen Boozang, John Jacobi, R. Erik Lillquist, Laura
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1 See Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1395,
1402 (describing race-conscious, preferential affirmative action as selection mechanisms that
include race-based quotas or preferences and distinguishing "soft," non-preferential forms of
affirmative action that enhance the ability of minority group members to have access to and
participate in particular educational or labor opportunities).
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California, Florida, and Texas, have recently adopted "percentage plan" systems
to select students for admission to public colleges and universities. As a general
matter, percentage plans guarantee admission to public universities based upon a
student's rank in her high school class.2 In essence, percentage plans de-
emphasize the role of standardized college entrance examinations in the
admissions process, allowing high-achieving high school seniors to gain
admission to state colleges or universities without regard to their SAT score.3
While the mechanics of these plans vary widely, they all share a key
characteristic: they attempt to secure racial diversity in public higher education
without the use of race-conscious, preferential affirmative action.
These plans have come under attack from both the left and the right ends of
the political spectrum. For progressives, these plans are philosophically
objectionable because they are not explicitly designed to remedy past
discrimination by taking race into account in admissions decisions. Progressives
also object to the practical outcome of percentage plans, which they believe
actually reduce the number of minority students in public higher education. For
conservatives, percentage plans are little more than a thinly-disguised attempt to
achieve the same ends as race-conscious, preferential affirmative action. These
plans are objectionable, then, because they benefit less-qualified minorities at the
expense of more-qualified Whites. These political and legal arguments raise
important issues, but these discussions have failed to focus on an astoundingly
ironic reality at the heart of percentage plans: percentage plans can work if and
only if secondary education remains firmly segregated. This irony raises profound
questions not only about the arguments proffered by both the left and the right,
but also about the very role of the state in securing a truly equal playing field for
all Americans.
To delve into this paradox, it is instructive to review the objections to
percentage plans raised by both the left and the right. Progressives argue that
percentage plans reduce the overall number of Blacks and Hispanics enrolled in
public higher education, and thus constitute a significant civil rights set-back.4 A
majority of the members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights have
issued a strongly-worded statement condemning percentage plans.5 These
Commission members argue that percentage plans are an inadequate substitute for
2 See infra Part II.3id.
4 See, e.g., Mary Frances Berry, How Percentage Plans Keep Minority Students Out of
College, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuc., Aug. 4, 2000, at A48 (arguing with respect to the
University of Texas at Austin that "the university now rejects minority students who would
have been admitted under affirmative action and who, based on past experience, would have
succeeded. Why? They happen to not be in the top 10 percent of their high-school classes").
5 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOwARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF PERCENTAGE PLANS
IN HIGHER EDUCATION: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTES FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION? (2000),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/percent/stmnt.htm (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS].
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race-conscious affirmative action because they have not, and in their present form
will not, secure racial diversity in public institutions of higher education,
particularly at the graduate level.6 Under this theory, a race-conscious admissions
system is superior because it attempts to mitigate the discriminatory effect of
standardized tests on Blacks and Hispanics as well as other systemic problems
that curb academic achievement, such as inferior and segregated secondary
schools
Opponents of affirmative action argue that percentage plans are problematic
for the very same reason as the previous race-conscious admissions regime: they
admit less well-qualified minority group members at the expense of Whites.8 This
view sees percentage plans as an attempt to achieve the same result as race-
conscious affirmative action, but via a system of 'raceless' engineering [that]
6 Their statement was emphatic with respect to the need for affirmative action: "The
percentage plans are experimental responses to the attacks on affirmative action. But they are
no substitute for strong race-conscious affirmative action in higher education. What is required
is a Supreme Court decision reaffirming Bakke and making affirmative action an imperative."
Id. at6.
7 See id.; see also Michael T. Nettles, Laura W. Pema & Catherine M. Millett, Race and
Testing in College Admissions, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS
AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 105 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller, eds., 1998). The
authors stated that:
Regardless of the standardized test used, a smaller percentage of African Americans and
Hispanics fall into the high end of the score distribution than of whites and Asians. Thus, a
very small number of African Americans and Hispanics would be admitted to the most
selective institutions if test scores were the dominant criterion.
Id.
8 See, e.g., Daniel Golden, Some High Schools Finagle to Cram Kids Into Top 10% of
Class, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2000, at A1. Golden noted that:
Just as affirmative-action preferences used to, the class-rank law is breeding resentment by
crowding out some white applicants. 'There's no amount of cheating Westlake [a
suburban high school] can do to make up for how unfair the law is,' says Eric Renner, a
senior who scored 1180 on his SATs, well above the national average of 1016 on a 1600-
point scale, but 12 points below the Westlake mean.
Id.; see also Rick Bragg, Minority Enrollment Rises in Florida College System, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2000, at A 18 (reporting the statement of Sam J. Yarger, Dean of the School of
Education at the University of Miami, who called Florida's percentage plan "Bush's Theory of
Relativity," and asserted that the "real argument ... is whether minorities are entitled to
positions in the state university system when there is a nonminority applicant with better
academic and other relevant credentials"); Jennifer Radcliffe, College Admissions Rule
Generates Debate About Equity; A Law That Guarantees Slots for Top Students at Texas
Colleges Is Hailed and also Called Unfair, THE FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 22, 2000,
at 4B ("Those who do not like the rule say that some high schools have higher academic
standards than others. In top-notch schools, the top 25 percent of students are all well-prepared
for college, they say.").
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tolerates more mediocrity."9 Of course, such a line of argument does not end
there. If percentage plans can be viewed as a race-neutral means to achieve the
same ends as race-conscious affirmative action, perhaps percentage plans violate
the rights of White students. After all, the Equal Protection Clause is violated
whenever state action is animated by a discriminatory purpose, such as the desire
to advance the interests of Blacks and Hispanics by enhancing their representation
at state colleges and universities that would invariably come at the expense of
Whites and Asians. 10 From this perspective, the fact that the state has chosen to
use "raceless" means-a percentage plan-to effectuate discriminatory ends will
not insulate it from constitutional chajlenge." Indeed, proponents of this view
might add that courts will view a facially neutral rule with added suspicion where
such a rule comes shortly after the rejection of a facially discriminatory policy
that had sought to achieve the same ends as the facially neutral rule. 2
The critiques from both left and right, however, fail to address in a
meaningful way the disturbing paradox, identified earlier, that is at the root of
percentage plan schemes. I want to give that reality stark emphasis: percentage
plans can only secure racial diversity in public colleges and universities because
of significant racial segregation at the secondary school level. As one
commentator pointedly observed: "Racial segregation among high schools is so
entrenched that manipulating these percentages can produce for college
admissions whatever racial composition politicians desire.' 13 Governor Jeb Bush
suggested as much in his remarks announcing the "One Florida Initiative":
To further increase minority enrollment in the state university system, we will
implement the Talented 20 Prograr. This program will guarantee state
university admission to the top 20 percent of students in every Florida high
school senior class, regardless of one's SAT or ACT scores. Even with the
elimination of race and ethnicity as a factor in admissions, the Talented 20
Program will result in a net increase in minority enrollment in the state university
system.
14
9 Shelby Steele, Engineering Mediocrity, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 30, 2000, at 41
("Absent a hard-earned parity of skills and abilities between the races, 'inclusion' is necessarily
a corruption.").
1o See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
12 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000) (striking down a
policy of permitting students to pray before football games as a violation of the Establishment
Clause and noting that the "evolution of the current policy [made it] reasonable to infer that the
specific purpose of the policy was to preserve a popular 'state-sponsored religious practice"'
that had been struck down previously by the district court (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 596 (1992))); see also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
13 Paul Attewell, Mirage of Meritocracy, AM. PROsPECT, July 17, 2000, at 12.
14 See Governor Jeb Bush, Announcement of the One Florida Initiative, at http://
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How could Governor Bush have so confidently asserted that Florida's
percentage plan would result in a "net increase" in minority enrollment in the
state university system? The answer is clear: because of the certainty of racial
segregation at the secondary school level. In a state where a significant proportion
of a state's schools have a majority of minority group members, a percentage plan
which selects from the top percentile of each of the state's high schools will yield
racial diversity at the collegiate level, all other selection factors being equal.' 5 The
United States Commission on Civil Rights identified this paradox and criticized
Governor Bush's tacit assumptions. In its statement criticizing Governor Bush for
"voluntarily" instituting the "One Florida Initiative," the Commission's majority
made the following observation: 'The Plan is an unprovoked stealth
acknowledgment-and acceptance-that the existing school and housing
segregation will never change and that longstanding efforts to remedy the race
discrimination that was legal in Florida have been abandoned.' 6 Given this, even
a casual observer might remark at the irony of the state's position. Percentage
plans attempt to enhance racial diversity in the state's colleges and universities by
taking advantage of the heavily racially segregated nature of the state's high
schools; they attempt to create racial diversity in college by maintaining racial
segregation in high school. The reality is that percentage plans can only succeed
with their articulated aim "[b]ecause racial segregation dominates much of the
American landscape."' 7
It is not enough to identify this reality as ironic, because its devastating
implications run much deeper than mere irony. When the state institutes a
mechanism that attempts to create racial diversity in public higher education out
of racial segregation in secondary education, it is fallacious to perceive that
mechanism as just another affirmative action plan. Instead, it is more accurate to
www.myflorida.com/myflorida/govemmentAeam/one-florida/announcementlnitiative.html
(Nov. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Announcement].
' See Barry Klein and Stephen Hegarty, College Program Has Little Impact, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000, at IA (reporting that while "different in some respects, the
Florida and Texas plans share a critical element: Their impact is directly proportional to the
degree in which their high schools are segregated"). See generally Gary Orfield & John T. Yun,
Resegregation in American Schools, The Civil Rights Project, Harvard
University (June 1999), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/
resegregation99.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Orfield &
Yun Study]. The Orfield and Yun study found, as a general matter, that school segregation has
increased substantially in the South since the late 1980s. Id. at 11-13. With respect to Florida,
the study found that the state was among the most segregated in the nation for Black and Latino
students. Id. at 20. For instance, in 1996-1997 almost 30% of Florida's Black and Latino
students attended schools that were 90-100% minority. Id. at 20, 23-24.
16 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5. In examining the extent of racial diversity
in the Texas system of higher education post-Hopwood, the Commission also observed that:
"[T]hese results show that a color-blind law in a racially segregated primary and secondary
public school environment can promote some diversity in undergraduate admissions." Id. at 3.
17 Id. at 6.
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describe percentage plans as a reflection of current day educational apartheid.
Percentage plans are made necessary and indeed can only be perceived as a viable
affirmative action mechanism because they function against a background
educational system that is both racially segregated and profoundly unequal. Thus,
percentage plans are not just a newfangled affirmative action device. Properly
reconceived, they are a barometer of the inability of certain segments of the
student population to compete for admission to state colleges and universities. But
why does this shift in emphasis, this exercise in renaming, matter?
It matters because when a state institutes a percentage plan it is explicitly
acknowledging and reifying the deleterious effects of a separate and unequal
educational system. This thesis is bome out in several ways. First, when a state
institutes a percentage plan, it is implicitly relying on the racially segregated
nature of the secondary schools to achieve the desired level of racial diversity at
the higher education level. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the state itself
played a role in creating and maintaining the racially segregated school system in
the first place. The state as an entity is inextricably linked to the segregated
system of primary and secondary education that it relies upon in creating its
percentage plan.
Second, in creating percentage plans, the state is also recognizing the fact that
there is systematic disadvantage associated with attending racially segregated
secondary schools. With a percentage plan, the focus of the admissions
determination now becomes the student's performance relative to other students
in her class, not as relative to other students in other high schools in other parts of
the city, metropolitan area, or state. Percentage plans thus "localize" competition,
and indeed, that is often seen as a virtue. 18 But a localized focus should highlight
rather than obscure the bigger picture. The reality is that percentage plans were
designed to sidestep an unfortunate truth. Some high school students, often
educated in urban and racially segregated environments, are less prepared
academically than other high school students, often educated in suburban and
racially segregated environments, to compete for admission to the state's system
of higher education. It is impossible to consider these students' lack of preparation
without focusing on its proximate cause: mutually reinforcing racial segregation
in our schools and in our residential areas and the interrelationship among racial
segregation, poverty, and disadvantage.
Exactly which students tend to be less academically prepared? Students in
schools where race and poverty are concentrated, which tend to be predominantly
Black and Hispanic; students in schools that have been consistently under-funded
relative to other schools in the state, which tend to be predominantly Black and
Hispanic; students in schools with less access to advanced placement and college
preparatory courses, which tend to be predominantly Black and Hispanic, and
18Indeed, proponents stress how percentage plans reward "merit" and emphasize
"fairness" because similarly situated students compete against each other for admission to the
state's system of higher education. See infra Part 1I.
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students in schools that are undergoing a process of "resegregation," which tend
to be predominantly Black and Hispanic. Segregated residential areas reinforce
and segregate our schools; segregated schools reinforce and segregate our
residential areas; and poverty and associated ills reinforce systematic
disadvantage, whose unhappy byproduct is the disparate level of academic
preparedness we currently observe.
Perhaps most importantly, percentage plans reflect not only the state's
recognition of racial segregation and associated systematic disadvantage, but such
plans also reify and continue those ills by implementing a mechanism intended to
achieve racial diversity upon a foundation of inequality. I argue that the state may
not blithely create a system intended to achieve racial diversity in higher
education that takes as its basis and operating reality, systemic disadvantage,
racial segregation, and educational apartheid without seriously attempting to
ameliorate the sources of those problems. I argue that when the state attempts to
construct racial diversity out of racial segregation and inequality, it is obligated to
do something more than tinker with the mechanics of percentage plans to increase
the number of minority students in public universities. Along with its recognition
and acknowledgement of the deep ironies highlighted by percentage plans, the
state must accept some level of responsibility for righting these wrongs.
In this article, I do not argue that the state's obligation rises to the level of a
federal Constitutional dimension; rather, I concede that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal constitution in a variety of areas would make such an
argument exceedingly difficult.' 9 Instead, the nature of the state's obligation is
morally, ethically, and, I hope ultimately, politically compelling.2° Our national
discussion of the propriety of percentage plans is just beginning, and thus this is
the appropriate moment to re-characterize the nature of that debate. My aim here
is to re-cast that discussion and bring the debate onto a different plane entirely.
We must move away from a compressed debate on the pros and cons of
percentage plans as a substitute affirmative action measure and move toward a
fuller appreciation of percentage plans as reflective of deep educational disparities
and the state's continuing obligation to solve them.
Part II of this article describes "percentage plans" by examining their
adoption and their particular mechanics in three highly populated states: Texas,
19See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding
that education is not a fundamental right).
20 It is true that a particular state's constitution might well be interpreted to create a legal
obligation on the state to rectify the state of affairs that I will describe within. See infra Part II.B.
My focus here, however, is upon describing the state's role in creating the current state of
affairs, probing the constitutionality of percentage plans, and on arguing that the state has an
obligation to rectify our segregated and inferior secondary school system because of
fundamental notions of fairness. I leave for others an examination of the actual litigation
possibilities that state constitutions present. See, e.g., john powell, Segregation and Educational
Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools,. 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 337, 361-402
(1996).
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California, and Florida. This discussion suggests that while the mechanics of the
plans differ, they share a desire to reward academic achievement in high school
and enhance racial diversity at the college and university level in the absence of
more traditional forms of affirmative action. This section also shows how the
reality of racial segregation in secondary schools is critical to the architecture of
the percentage plan programs. Part 1I1 of this article explores the historical
underpinnings of racial segregation in education and the inter-related nature of
educational and residential segregation. It also establishes the states' role in
creating and maintaining this segregation, and places percentage plans in
historical context among other efforts to remedy discrimination in education. Part
IV of this article explores the legal context of percentage plans, and describes the
likely outcome of potential constitutional challenges to percentage plan programs.
Part V of this article describes the philosophical and moral challenges posed by
percentage plans, and explores the role of the state as a moral actor. Finally, Part
VI of this article provides policy proposals designed to remedy the entrenched
harms that we fird highlighted at the heart of percentage plans.
11. "PERCENTAGE PLANS": BUILDING RACIALLY DIVERSE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITIES ON A FOUNDATION OF RACIALLY SEGREGATED SECONDARY
SCHOOLS
Defined at the most basic level, a "percentage plan" is a method for
determining admission to a particular state's university system.2' Percentage plans
link admission to the state's university system to a student's academic
performance in high school. Under a percentage plan, a student attaining a grade
point average high enough to place her in some fixed percentile of her class is
rewarded for that achievement by gaining admission to her state university
system.22 Presently, Texas, California, and Florida have some version of a
percentage plan in place to determine admission to their state universities and
colleges. These states have adopted percentage plans in reaction to a variety of
stimuli, and the plans themselves vary significantly in terms of their mechanics,
effect, and implementation. What they share, however, is a mechanism that
provides admission or eligibility to the state's colleges and universities that
simultaneously attempts to ensure both "merit" and racial diversity.
2 See Editorial Desk, Affirmative Geography, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1999, at A22
("[Percentage plans] offer automatic admission [to state colleges and universities] to the top
graduates of every high school in the state.").
22 See Editorial Desk, After Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at A14
(defining a percentage plan as an admissions system under which "students who achieve a
specified ranking in their high school graduating classes are guaranteed admission to state
colleges").
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A. Texas: The Ten Percent Plan
In Hopwood v. Texas,23 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the University of Texas (UT) School of Law's admissions
program violated the Fourteenth Amendment by providing "preferences" to "less-
qualified" Black and Mexican American applicants at the expense of "more-
qualified" White applicants.24 The effect of the Hopwood ruling was to prohibit
the use of race-conscious, preferential affirmative action in university admissions
in the state of Texas.2 ' The immediate result of the Hopwood decision was to
decrease Black and Mexican American enrollment at the state's most prestigious
campuses.26
In response to the Hopwood decision, Governor George W. Bush signed
House Bill No. 588 into law in 1997, creating the Texas 'Fen Percent Plan., 27
The mechanics of the Ten Percent Plan are quite simple. Under the law,
admission to any state undergraduate college or university is guaranteed to all
public and private high school students in the state who graduate with a grade
point average in the top ten percent of their high school's graduating class. 28
Under the Ten Percent Plan, the state discontinued the use of a minimum
standardized test score (such as the SAT) as part of the admissions criterion for
students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school class.29
23 78 F.3d 932,945-46 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
24 See id. at 935-38.
21 See Mary Ann Roser, Race Ruling Stumps Universities; 8 Months After Hopwood
Decision, Texas Education Officials Have Few Ideas On How to Retain Minority Students,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMEN, Nov. 13, 1996, at B1.26 See TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION COORDINATING BOARD, REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF
THE HOPWOOD DECISION ON MINORITY APPLICATIONS, OFFERS, AND ENROLLMENTS AT PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN TEXAS 3-4, (1998) (explaining that UT Austin and
Texas A&M, Texas' most prestigious schools, experienced "significant declines in offers and
enrollments in 1997 for African-Americans and Hispanics") (on file with author).27 TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (Supp. 2001). At a public hearing to consider the Bill,
Professor Gerald Torres recognized the relationship between H.B. 588 and Hopwood, and
stated: "Hopwood created the crisis people felt in higher education. With every crisis there is
also an opportunity. The legislature has grasped that opportunity in HB 588." Audio tape:
Hearings on H.B. 588 Before the House Committee On Higher Education, held by the Texas
75th Legislature (May 18, 1997) (statement of Professor Gerald Torres, University of Texas
Law School) (on file with author) [hereinafter Texas House Committee Hearings]; see also
Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
245, 253 (1999) (asserting that Representative Irma Rangel introduced the Bill in direct
response to the Hopwood decision).28 TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (Supp. 2001). The Texas Ten Percent Plan, like the
plans in California and Florida, applies solely to undergraduate programs; percentage plans'
failure to address graduate programs is a significant flaw. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 5 (asserting that percentage plans' "inattention to law schools, medical schools, and
other graduate and professional schools" is a "major problem").
2 UNIVERSrrY OF TEXAS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF HB 588 AT THE UNIvERsrrY
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Consequently, the Ten Percent Plan has its largest impact on the most selective
schools within the state that had previously relied on standardized test scores as an
admissions selection mechanism. 30 As some commentators have noted, the
importance of recruitment and outreach to eligible minority students is of vital
importance if diversity is to be achieved under the Ten Percent Plan, since
students must first apply to a particular state college or university in order to be
accepted.3
In signing House Bill No. 588 into law, Governor Bush emphasized that the
Ten Percent Plan would reward the values of effort, fortitude, and merit. Indeed,
his signing statement reflects those views:
This legislation says to Texas high school students, if you work and study hard
enough to rank in the top ten percent of your high school class, you can earn the
right to go to college. We want all our students in Texas to have a fair shot at
achieving their dreams and this legislation gives them that fair shot if they are
willing to work for it. We want our universities to reach out to students from all
walks of life, and this legislation gives them the flexibility to do just that.32
But the bill was intended to do more than reward hard work and superior
academic performance. The bill was also clearly intended to promote racial
diversity in the state's colleges and universities in the absence of race-conscious
affirmative action. For instance, at the first hearing before the Texas State Senate
to consider the bill, the Deputy Commissioner of the Texas Higher Education
Coordinating Board stated: "What we believe is that this kind of bill
would... increase the pool, the diversity of the pool of students that's available to
institutions in Texas, particularly the most selective institutions."33 There is little
doubt that the state legislature was aware of the fact that the Ten Percent Plan's
ability to achieve racial diversity at the college and university level was closely
OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN REPORT NUMBER 2: ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND PERSISTENCE OF TOP
10% STUDENTS ACADEMIC YEAR 1998-99 AND FALL 1999 (April 2000), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/student/research/reports/admissions/HB5882000329.html. See TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (Supp. 2001), available at Texas Legislature Online,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last visited May 26, 2000).
'o See T. Vance McMahan & Don R. Willett, Hope from Hopwood: Charting a Positive
Civil Rights Course for Texas and the Nation, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 163, 167 (1999)
("The law applies across-the-board to all of Texas' 35 state universities but is aimed chiefly at
prestigious schools like UT, which have a cap on enrollment, not less-selective schools that
routinely accept lower-ranking students.").31
see id.
32 Office of the Governor of Texas, Governor Signs Admissions Bill (May 20, 1997), at
http://www.govemor.state.tx.us/message/Record97/05-20-97castration,admissions.htmi (last
visited May 26, 2000) (on file with author).
33 Audio tape: Hearings on H.B. 588 Before the Texas State Senate, held by the Texas
75th Legislature (Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Don Brown, Deputy Commissioner of Texas
Higher Education Coordinating Board) (on file with author).
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linked to racial segregation at the secondary school level. At a meeting before the
House Committee on Higher Education, one witness frankly explained how the
mechanics of the Ten Percent Plan would provide racial diversity in Texas'
college and universities:
The 10% rank is going to be particularly efficacious in the state of Texas
ironically as a result of the extreme racial isolation of its high schools. Because of
that racial isolation, many rural and urban minority schools will have a number
of minority students in the top 10% of their class who, I believe, will have an
opportunity to be considered for admissions at flagship institutions where they
are not presently able to do so because of the lower test scores these groups tend
to present.34
Recent evidence suggests that the Ten Percent Plan has met with some
success in increasing the number of Blacks and Hispanics enrolled at the state's
most prestigious schools since the elimination of race-conscious affirmative
action.3" Such success is largely the result of the state's concerted effort in the
wake of the Hopwood decision to strengthen outreach and recruitment efforts to
the minority community, and to provide enhanced need-based financial aid.36 The
34 See Texas House Committee Hearings, supra note 27 (statement of Michael Olivas,
University of Houston law professor and former trustee of the College Board). At the same
hearing, another witness, UT History Professor David Montejano, testified that he was
confident that the bill would maintain a "minimum floor of diversity without the use of race or
ethnic criteria." Id. (statement of Dr. David Montejano, Professor of History at UT Austin).
Subsequently, in an interview conceming the Ten Percent Plan, Montegano stated that although
the bill was "color-blind," "it uses our bitter history of segregation to promote diversity." In the
same interview he described Texas' state of segregation as so severe that the high schools are
"almost entirely white or black or brown." William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, Merit and
Diversity After Hopwood, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 185 (1999).35 See UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF HB 588 AT THE
UNIvERsrIY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN REPORT NUMBER 3: ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND
PERSISTENCE OF TOP 10% STUDENTS ACADEMIC YEAR 1999-2000 AND FALL 2000, available at
http://www.utexas.edu/student/research/reports/admissions/HB588-report3.html (Nov. 2000).
This report stated that:
In terms of percentages of minorities enrolled, the entering freshman class of 2000 was as
diverse as the entering class of 1996. The percentage of whites fell from 65% to 63%,
while African Americans held steady at 4%. Hispanics fell slightly from 14% to 13%.
Asian American and foreign students showed the greatest percentage increases.
Id. It should be noted that these very recent entering class figures, while consistent with pre-
Hopwood statistics, are not consistent with the proportion of African Americans and Hispanics
in the state. Bush Uses 'Fuzzy Math' on Diversity Data, Says Civil Rights Group, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 19,2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newswire File (reporting from an Americans
for a Fair Chance press release). Therefore, the University of Texas still is "not representative of
the population." Id.
3 The state has recognized the need to actively recruit minority students if the Ten Percent
Plan is to achieve its intended aim. For example, in October 1998, The Texas Higher Education
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state's responsiveness to the lack of minority representation in its colleges and
universities is laudable and underscores the fact that the Ten Percent Plan was
created for that purpose. The state's efforts, however, have focused primarily on
recruitment and retention; they have not extended to either desegregating the
state's secondary schools or to meaningfully changing academic achievement
levels for students outside of the top ten percent of their graduating class.
B. California's Approach to Percentage Plans
In 1995, Governor Pete Wilson of California issued an Executive Order
decreeing that the University of California (UC) would not use race, religion, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin as criteria for admission to any program of
study.37 In the following year, a majority of the citizens of the state of California
approved Proposition 209, the "California Civil Rights Initiative," which
amended the state constitution to eliminate public race- and gender-based
affirmative action programs.38 Proposition 209 eliminated state and local
government affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment,
Coalition formed the Texas Commission on a Representative Student Body and charged it with
tracking higher education programs to prevent the potential segregating effects of Hopwood.
See Texas Commission on a Representative Student Body (TCRSB), Brief History of the
Higher Education Coalition, at http://www.uhsa.uh.edu/TCRSB/TCHis.html (last visited May
31, 2000). The TCRSB recognized numerous barriers to recruiting minority students and
recommended the creation of a fund to finance recruitment and that the legislature appropriate
funds for student aid based on need. See TCRSB, Overview of Findings, at http://
www.uhsa.uh.edu/TCRSB/overview.html (last visited May 31, 2000). In 1999, the Texas
legislature passed a statute requiring that the Boards of Trustees for each school district require
that each high school within the district post notices in guidance counselors' offices providing
information regarding the Ten Percent Plan. See S.B. 510, Texas 76th Legis. (1999), available
at Texas Legislature Online, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/ (last modified Feb. 2, 2000).
Finally, in April 2000, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board issued a Uniform
Recruitment and Retention Strategy recommending that all public institutions of higher
education institute a variety of enrollment activities intended to "identify, attract, enroll and
retain students who reflect the population of this state." TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION
COORDINATING BOARD, UNIFORM RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION STRATEGY: A PLAN TO
IDENTIFY, ATTRACT, ENROLL AND RETAIN STUDENTS WHO REFLECT THE POPULATION OF
TEXAS, at title page (2000), at http://www.thecb.state.tx.us/; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 61.086 (Supp. 2001). The state has also begun the Longhorn Opportunity Scholars Program
which "identifies high schools in poor areas that traditionally have not sent many students to the
University of Texas or Texas A&M University and grants scholarships to the students who
graduate in the top 10 percent of those schools." Hilary Hurd, Texas' Ten Percent Plan Has
Boosted Minority Enrollment, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 26, 2000, at 24.
" Executive Order W 124-95 was issued on June 1, 1995 and was entitled "End
Preferential Treatment and to Promote Individual Opportunity Based on Merit." The Regents,
Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment-Admissions (SP-I), at http://www.ucop.edu/
regents/policies/spl.html (last visited May 23, 2000).
38 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1997).
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public education, and public contracting to the extent such programs granted
preferential treatment based on race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin.l
Proposition 209 had an immediate impact on the numbers of Black and
Hispanic students admitted to the UC system. While the number of Black and
Hispanic students admitted to undergraduate programs in the UC system fell only
slightly in the first year after Proposition 209 went into effect, there were
significant declines at the system's flagship campuses. 40 Against this backdrop, in
early 1998, a UC official recommended that the University of California Board of
Regents adopt a plan that would admit "the top four percent of each high school
class" in order to "combat the inequality of educational opportunities across the
state."'' During a series of Regents meetings, the proposed plan was characterized
both as an effort to ensure geographic diversity, thereby strengthening the UC's
"historical commitment to represent in its student body the entire population of
the State of California," and as a mechanism that might stimulate weaker schools
to better prepare their students for college.42
State officials who discussed the propriety of such a plan, however, were
unsure whether the plan would in fact enhance racial diversity in the University of
California system.4 3 At best, the impact on diversity was predicted to be
39 See California Secretary of State, Analysis of Proposition 209, at
http://vote96.ss.ca.govNote96/htl/BP/209analysis.htm (last visited June 14, 2000).40 See Ethan Bronner, Fewer Minorities Entering University of California, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1998, at A28 (reporting that far "fewer black and Hispanic students will enroll as
freshman at the University of California's most competitive campuses ... although their
numbers will drop only slightly throughout the state system.. ."). Recent reports suggest that
minority enrollment at California flagship schools has not returned to its pre-Proposition 209
level. See Jerome Karabel, Commentary; Affirmative Action Had Real Merit, L.A. TIMES, July
10, 2000, at B-7 ("There ... has been a precipitous decline in minority undergraduates at
UCLA and at the flagship Berkeley campus, where black and Mexican American enrollments
have been reduced to their lowest levels in more than 25 years."). More specifically, at UC-
Berkeley in 1999, "[t]he figures for minority enrollment remain[ed] lower than [in] 1997 ... the
last group of students enrolled before [Proposition 209]." Anne Benjaminson, Minority
Enrollment Rises at UC-Berkeley, DAILY CALIFORNIAN VIA U-WIRE, Dec. 1, 1999, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UNIVERSITY WIRE File.
41 Senate Looks into Making Top 4 Percent of Students in Each High School UC-Eligible,
NOTICE: A PUBLICATION OF THE ACADEMIC SENATE (University of California, Oakland, Cal.),
Mar. 1998, at I (quoting UC Academic Senate Board of Admissions and Relations with
Schools Chair, Keith Widaman).
42 Regents of the University of California, Minutes of the Committee on Educational
Policy (Feb. 18, 1999), available at http://www.ucop.edu/regents/minutes/ (paraphrasing
Professor Keith Widaman) [hereinafter Regents Minutes February]; see also Regents of the
University of California, Minutes of the Committee on Educational Policy (Mar. 18, 1999),
available at http://www.ucop.edu/regents/minutes/ (statement of Governor Gray Davis)
[hereinafter Regents Minutes March].
43 For instance, at a March 1999 Board of Regents meeting, Governor Gray Davis
reportedly said that the "proposal will add about 1,800 more students who will enroll. Of those
1,800, about half will be people of color, so the proposal may or may not affect the overall
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"modest.'"44 Indeed, it is not clear that all of the Regents believed it appropriate to
design an eligibility plan with the specific aim of enhancing racial diversity. At
least one member of the University of California Board of Regents, Ward
Connerly, took the position that to the extent that the plan attempted to achieve
such an aim, it would run afoul of Proposition 209.4 In March 1999, the
University of California Regents adopted the plan, and created a new "path to
eligibility," that allowed the "top four percent of students in each California
public high school [to] be designated UC-eligible and offered admission at one of
eight general campuses. '46 This new path to eligibility or "Eligibility in the Local
Context" plan became effective for all public high schools students submitting
applications for admission to UC undergraduate schools for the fall of 2001 .
More recently, the President of the University of California has proposed a
"12.5 percent plan" or "dual admissions program" that is explicitly intended to
increase racial diversity within the UC system.4' This plan is intended to "send a
clear signal to high-achieving students in low-performing high schools, many of
whom are underrepresented minorities, that they have a clear path to a UC
degree."49 The key aspect of the proposed 12.5 percent program is that it
diversity at the University of California." Regents Minutes March, supra note 42, at 5.
44 See CAL. NOTES (Univ. of Cal.), Mar. 1999 (reporting that "[a] UC analysis indicates
that the top four percent path would make eligible an additional 3,600 students who would not
otherwise qualify. Of those, it is estimated that 56 percent would be white; 11 percent Asian
American; 20 percent, Chicano/Latino[J;] and 5 percent, African American"), available at
www.ucop.edu/pathways/calnotes/mar99_eligibility.html.
'5 Connerly's position with respect to the 4% plan was quite clear: "Regent Connerly
believed that in doing anything that is designed to affect the racial outcome of the student body,
the University would violate Proposition 209 and thus be open to lawsuits." See Regents
Minutes, supra note 42, Feb. 18, 1999, at 14.
46Regents Adopt 4% Plan, Arts Requirement, CAL. NOTES (Univ. of
Cal.)' Apr. 1999, available at www.ucop.edu/pathways/calnotes/apr99_plan.html.47 Paths to UC Eligibilityfor Freshman, CAL. NOTES (Univ. of Cal.), Sept. 1999, available
at www.ucop.edu/pathways/calnotes/sep99_plan.htnl. Eligibility in the Local Context was one
of three pathways to eligibility for prospective freshmen submitting applications to UC schools.
Id. (explaining that there are "three paths to UC eligibility for prospective freshman: (1)
superior academic performance in a statewide context; (2) superior performance on
examinations alone; and (3) superior academic performance in the local context"). The
Eligibility in the Local Context Program functions as follows: Students ranking in the top four
percent of their high school class following their junior year are required to submit an
application for undergraduate admission and to designate a preferred UC campus. See id. There
is, however, no guarantee that students will be admitted to their "first choice" school. This is the
case because "[i]ndividual campus selection policies remain unchanged, and the ELC students
will be evaluated under those policies along with other students in the applicant pool." See Nuts
and Bolts Information About New Local Context Eligibility Path for Freshman, CAL. NOTES
(Univ. of Cal.), Sept. 1999, available at www.ucop.edu/pathways/calnotes/sep99_plan.html.4
1 See Karen W. Arenson, California Proposal Aims To Improve College Diversity, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at A16.
4' Letter from Richard C. Atkinson, President, University of California, to Michael
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recognizes the link between high concentrations of Black, Hispanic, and Native
American students in particular high schools and attendant disadvantage. In
asking that the University of California Academic Counsel consider the proposed
12.5 percent plan, the President of the University of California made the
following assertion:
The dual admission [12.5 percent] plan would result in other benefits to the State:
There is a high concentration of underrepresented minorities in low-performing
high schools. Consequently, significantly more African American, Hispanic and
Native American students would be given the opportunity to earn a UC degree. 0
In some respects the proposed 12.5 percent plan is very similar to the four
percent plan because the ability to gain admission to a UC school is based on high
school rank.5' However, under the 12.5 percent plan, qualifying students are not
made automatically eligible for admission to a UC campus. Instead, under the
new proposal, students ranking below the top four but above the 12.5 percent of
their high school class would be simultaneously admitted to a California
community college and a UC campus.52 Such students would then be required to
satisfactorily complete their freshman and sophomore requirements at the
community college before they were allowed to "complete their upper-division
studies at the UC campus."53 In July 2001, the University of California Regents
approved the Dual Admissions Program.1
4
C. Florida: The Talented 20 Program
Unlike the percentage plans adopted in Texas and California, Florida's
percentage plan arose out of Governor Jeb Bush's "voluntary" decision to
eliminate race-conscious affirmative action.55 On November 9, 1999, Governor
Jeb Bush signed Executive Order 99-281 as part of his "One Florida Initiative.,'
56
Cowan, Chair, University of California Academic Council (Sept. 20, 2000), at
www.ucop.edu/ucophome/pres/comments/cowanltr.httnl [hereinafter Atkinson Letter].
50 id.
"' See Office of the President of the University of California, Questions and Answers about
the Proposed "Dual Admissions" Plan, at http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/pres/comments/
dualq&a.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001) (describing the 12.5 percent plan as "an expansion of
the current 4% by high school [plan]").52 See id.
53 Atkinson Letter, supra note 49.
14 University of California Board of Regents Approved Actions AcademicYear 2000-
2001, at http://www.ucop.edu/regents/aar/aar.html (last visited August 15, 2001).55 See Rick Bragg, supra note 8, at A 18 ("Unlike in Texas and California, which have
similar programs that produced initial drops in minority enrollment, 'we did not wait for a legal
challenge or a ballot initiative,' said Mr. Bush.").
16 Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999), available at http://www.state.fl.us/eog/
executive orders/1999/november/eo99-281.html (last visited June 7, 2000); see also
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Executive Order 99-281 eliminated the use of "racial or gender set-asides,
preferences and quotas" in government employment, state contracting, and higher
education. 7 As part of the same One Florida Initiative, Governor Bush also
announced the 'Talented 20 Program," a new avenue for admission to the state
university system.58 The program's mechanics are simple. Under the Talented 20
Program, admission to an undergraduate college or university within the state
system of higher education is guaranteed to students ranking in the top twenty
percent of their class at the end of their seventh semester in high school.5 9
There is no real question that the Talented 20 Program was designed to
"increase minority enrollment in the state university system. 6° The Talented 20
Program was proposed at the same time that Governor Bush eliminated the use of
race-conscious affirmative action. The Governor's statements were quite explicit:
the Talented 20 Program was created in an attempt to achieve racial diversity at
the university level without the use of race-conscious affirmative action.6' As
with the other percentage plans previously explored, the question is: would the
utilization of a percentage plan yield such a result? Some of the statements made
in opposition to the Talented 20 Program are instructive.
The One Florida Initiative was not quietly received; Governor Bush's
Announcement, supra note 14.
S7Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999), available at http://www.state.fl.us/eog/
executive orders/I 999/november/eo99-28 I.html (ast visited June 7, 2000). It should be noted
that, prior to Bush's proposal, the University of North Florida and Florida State University had
already eliminated the use of race as a factor in admissions. See Announcement, supra note 14.
5 Announcement, supra note 14. As part of the One Florida Initiative, Governor Bush also
made a variety of proposals. First, he proposed a forty-three percent increase for need-based
financial aid so that those "in the top 20 percent with need... may take advantage of our
admissions guarantee." Id. Next, he recommended that the state legislature approve a 1.6
million dollar grant to fund PSAT examinations for all tenth graders. Id. Finally, he also
proposed financial incentives to encourage teachers to provide advanced placement courses,
and that teachers in low performing schools receive additional training. Id.
59 See FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, TALENTED 20 REPORT, available at
http://www.borfl.org/borpubs/equityeducation/talented_20_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2001). Students must also complete nineteen college preparatory credits in order to be eligible
for the Talented 20 Program. Id. at 8. Under the Program, students are guaranteed admission to
one institution within the Florida system, but may not necessarily be admitted to their "first
choice institution since enrollment caps have been instituted at some universities." Id. at 2. The
Talented 20 Program is one of three "pathways of access" for students into the state university
system. The other two pathways utilize either traditional admissions criteria, such as grade point
average combined with SAT or ACT performance, or a "profile assessment," which uses a
wide variety of criteria to determine admission, including socio-economic status and geographic
location. Id. at 21. As is the case in Texas and California, Florida's Talented 20 Program does
nothing to attempt to enhance racial diversity within the state's graduate schools.
60 Announcement, supra note 14.
61 Id. ("Even with the elimination of race and ethnicity as a factor in admissions, the
Talented 20 program will result in a net increase in minority enrollment in the state university
system.").
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proposal was subject to intense opposition from its inception.62 Following a series
of protests and a sit-in in the Lieutenant Governor's office, Governor Bush agreed
to hold a series of three public hearings and delay the Board of Regents'
consideration of the One Florida Initiative.63 During those meetings, some voiced
concerns that the only way the Talented 20 Program would succeed in achieving
diversity at the university level would be if racial segregation in Florida high
schools persisted.64 Florida House Representative Chris Smith's statements were
perhaps the most pointed: "[T]he reasoning for the Top 20 percent, is that there
are black schools and white schools and if you take the top 20 percent, of course
some of them are going to be black in the black schools."65 Notwithstanding the
concerns raised at the hearings, on February 16, 2000, Governor Bush announced
that he planned to move forward with the One Florida Initiative, and the state
Board of Regents quickly approved the program's implementation.66 Further
61 See, e.g., Joe Humphrey, Protest Delays Board Vote on One Florida Initiative, ORACLE
VIA U-WIRE, Jan. 20, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UNIVERSITY WIRE File; see also Jewel
Gopwani, Florida Students Stunned By Bush's Plan, MICH. DAILY VIA U-WIRE, Nov. 15, 1999,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UNIVERSITY WIRE File; United in Opposition, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1999, at 20A (reporting that the One Florida Initiative was the subject of immediate
opposition from those on both sides of the affirmative action debate).
63 See Humphrey, supra note 62; Florida Legis., Joint Statement of Senator Meek and
Representative Hill, at http://www.freeflorida.net/joint.html. State Board of Regents approval is
required for any change to state university system admissions requirements. FLA. STAT.
§ 240.209 (1999).
64 One student stated: "What happens when minority populations drop? No plan has been
developed to ensure that the current under-represented populations remain the same and
continue to increase." One Florida Select Comm. Tallahassee Hearing (412 Knott Building),
Fla. S. (Feb. 10, 2000), (statement of Elan Thompson, senior business administration major at
Florida A&M University), available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/oneflorida (last visited May
24,2000).
65 One Florida Select Committee Miami Hearing, Fla. S. (Feb. 3, 2000) (statement of
Representative Chris Smith), available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/oneflorida (last visited May
24, 2000). Representative Smith represents the Broward County District, and the majority of his
constituents are either Black or Hispanic. Florida Legis., House District 93
Census, at httpl/www.leg.state.fl.us/house/members/census/h93cen.html (last visited May 24,
2000).
66 Press release, Executive Office of the Govemor of Florida, Governor Bush Moves
Forward With One Florida Initiative (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http://www.state.fl.us/
eog/press_releases/2000/feb/implement_2-16-00.html (on file with author). Governor Bush did
make some improvements to the program after the hearings. These changes included the
creation of the One Florida Accountability Commission which would review the extent of
minority student enrollment for a three year period, a recommendation that thirty million dollars
be spent to provide low performing high schools with computer equipment and Internet access,
and a recommendation that funds be targeted for teacher training and support for higher-level
courses in low-performing high schools. Id. The Talented 20 Program was also the subject of
state-court litigation. On February 25, 2000, the NAACP, through its Florida conference of
branches, and two individual plaintiffs filed a petition asserting that the Board of Regents and
the state Board of Education did not have authority to implement the Talented 20 Program.
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opposition to the One Florida Initiative surfaced on March 7, 2000, the opening
day of the Florida legislative session, when at least 11,000 civil rights leaders
demonstrated on Capitol Hill.67 Despite the fervent protest against the One
Florida Initiative, Governor Bush pushed forward and the plan was instituted for
students entering college in the fall of 2000.68 While it is too early to say exactly
what effect the Talented 20 Program will have on minority admissions,
"cascading," the movement of minority students from more prestigious to less
selective colleges and universities, is a real possibility.69 For instance, the
University of Florida, the state's most prestigious educational institution, "expects
a sharp decline in minority enrollment this fall., 70 But at the same time, many
officials of Florida's public universities have hailed the Talented 20 Program and
expect "minority enrollment likely will increase this fall at most of the 11 public
universities.'
7l
III. PERCENTAGE PLANS IN CONTEXT: HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL EDUCATION
It is far beyond the scope of this article to explore in comprehensive detail the
entire history of primary and secondary school segregation.72 Identifying the
immediate, intermediate, and distant "causes" of school segregation is a complex
and multi-balanced problem. First, there is no single, discrete phenomenon called
"school segregation." Of course, one might observe that many public and private
William Yardley, Legal Bump Laid for One Florida, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at
lB. Administrative Judge C.C. Adams found that the amendments to the admissions policy that
would result in implementation of the Talented 20 Program were valid. See NAACP v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, No. 00-0952RP (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings Mar. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ro/2000/00%2D0952%2Edoc.
67 See Nancy Cook Lauer, One Florida Edging Out Critics, THE TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT ONLINE, May 7, 2000, at http://www.myflorida.com/myfloida/govemmenmleam/
one florida news articles/onefledgingoutcritics.html.
68 See Bragg, supra note 8, at A 18; Cool Rhetoric, Fine-Tune Plan, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar.
9, 2000, at 22A (reporting that Governor Bush showed no signs of withdrawing his executive
order notwithstanding public protests).
69 See RoY L. BROOKS, GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO & MICHAEL SELMI, CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1219-20 (1995).
70 Editorial, Jury Still Out on Talented 20, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 14, 2001, at A 18.
" Scott Powers, Blacks Still Find Spot in College; Minority Enrollment is Up, and SA Ts
May Play a Lesser Role at State Universities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 2001, at A 1; Bragg,
supra note 8, at A 18. (reporting that the "first freshman class selected to Florida's state college
system since Gov. Jeb Bush put an end to race-based admissions has shown, instead of a
decrease in minority enrollment, an increase of 12 percent").
72 Several excellent works in this area provide invaluable background information. See,
e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT
LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); MARK
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (1994).
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primary and secondary schools are racially segregated.73 But it is impossible to
meaningfully examine "school segregation" without appreciating its co-
dependent variable: residential segregation. That is, school segregation and
residential segregation are deeply interdependent; there is a "symbiotic
relationship" between the two.74 In part, racially segregated schools have been
"caused" by our racially segregated neighborhoods, cities, and suburbs. In part,
our racially segregated schools "cause" our neighborhoods, cities, and suburbs to
be racially segregated. Second, just as there is a high level of interdependence
between the twin social phenomena of school segregation and residential
segregation, there is also high level of interdependence among the various actors
who have, over time, contributed to that present reality. This level of
interdependence makes it difficult to isolate discrete actors such as the state, the
federal government, the zoning board, the real estate industry, or mortgage
lenders and confidently attribute to each its fair share of culpability.
75
It is not my aim here to discem with exact specificity the role that Texas,
Florida, and California have each played (and continue to play) in creating and
maintaining a system of racial segregation in their respective school systems.
However, this does not mean that the actions that states such as Texas, Florida,
and California have taken in the past are irrelevant to my project. Instead, my
view is that information about how the state operated in the past to create today's
conditions will more fully inform the necessary discussion regarding the deeper
concerns raised by percentage plans. Thus, my argument is not that because a
particular state "caused" the segregated and inferior conditions that we observe
today, it is therefore legally required to ameliorate them. My view as to how the
past relates to the present in the context of my discussion of percentage plans is
more nuanced. The nature of the state's obligation to ameliorate the effects of
educational apartheid comes from establishing a system (percentage plans) which
relies for its success on the underlying racial segregation and unequal educational
opportunities below. From this perspective, an examination of the state's role in
creating the current system then, which it reifies and continues with percentage
plans, strengthens the argument (and hopefully the political resolve) that the state
must move aggressively to dismantle all of the disabling effects of the current
system.
'3 See generally Orfield & Yun Study, supra note 15.
74 As john powell has explained, the "link between housing and schools can also maintain
segregation. For example, the return to neighborhood schools, for which many policy makers
are now calling, may in fact maintain or increase the racial segregation of communities that are
segregated and isolated by race and class." john powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing
and Education, 80 MINN. L. REV. 749,756 (1996).
"' See id. at 763 ("It is difficult to join or even to identify all the possible governmental
parties that have contributed to housing and school segregation.").
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A. The Past: From De Jure School Segregation to Formal Equal
Opportunity
Beginning after the Civil War in states such as Texas, Florida, and California,
primary and secondary schools were required to be racially segregated by law.76 It
should not be forgotten that this was the period of formal legal inequality, which
came after the long, dark night of slavery, the brief shining promise of
Reconstruction, and the comeuppance of the Redemption. 7 During this period of
de jure school segregation, the "education [Blacks] received was generally
inferior in quality to that provided to southern whites. 'T This system of dejure,
legally mandated racial segregation was not dislodged in many instances until
well after the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education79 decision,
which held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."' As a
76 For example, in 1885, Florida adopted a constitutional provision which read: "[w]hite
and colored children shall not be taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be
made for both." SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A
SURVEY OF STATE SEGREGATION LAWS 1865-1953 90 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Paul E.
Wilson eds., 1975). In Texas a similar situation obtained, and section 7 of Article VII of the
Texas State Constitution of 1876 read: "[s]eparate schools shall be provided for the white and
colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both." Id. at 628. In California,
segregation of the races, explicitly including segregation of White schoolchildren from children
of "African or Mongolian" descent, was accomplished by a series of state statutes culminating
in the codification of the Political Code of California of 1872, which provided that: "[t]he
education of children of African descent and Indian children must be provided for in separate
schools." Id. at 40; see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, California's Racial History and
Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1521 (2000) (exploring the history of racial discrimination in California from a
multi-cultural perspective). See generally John Hope Franklin, Jim Crow Goes to School: The
Genesis of Legal Segregation in Southern Schools, in 7 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY
1700-1990: THE STRUGGLE OF EQUAL EDUCATION PART 1408-11 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1959)
(describing how the Southern states rushed to segregate public education by law after the end of
Reconstruction).
77 See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAERY TO
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (8th ed. 2000).78 ROBERT A. MARGO, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE SOUTH, 1880-1950: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 2 (1990).
79 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8o Id. at 495. Interestingly, however, California did experience a relatively lengthy reprieve
from state mandated segregation. See Irving G. Hendrick, Approaching Equality of Educational
Opportunity in California: The Successful Struggle of Black Citizens, 1880-1920, in 7 RACE,
LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: THE STRUGGLE OF EQUAL EDUCATION PART II 14
(Paul Finkelman ed., 1981) (describing how political agitation on the part of California's Black
leadership lead to the repeal of the state's political code "which had mandated separate schools
for black youth"). Unfortunately, that period of relative freedom and educational equal
opportunity was only to obtain between 1880-1920. After the late 1910s, the "visible growth of
the black population, coupled with court enforcement of segregated housing through restrictive
covenants in real estate deeds... resulted in an acceleration of discriminatory actions of a
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result, many generations of Black Americans attended primary and secondary
schools that were both separate and unequal.8
In many ways Brown represented both an end and a beginning. It represented
the end of formal inequality represented by dejure segregation, and the start of
the regime of "formal equal opportunity. 82 In the decades after Brown, amidst
sometimes fierce opposition, countless lawsuits were brought against a variety of
states and their political subdivisions in an attempt to make real Brown's promise
of equality; the ultimate goal was to desegregate hundreds of public school
districts. 3 These suits, coupled with vigorous federal enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, were successful, and for a time many local school districts
achieved some meaningful level of desegregation.14 But the country's and the
United States Supreme Court's enthusiasm for desegregation quickly waned.
Once federal enforcement of desegregation slowed, local school districts were
released from federal oversight, suburban school districts were absolved from any
obligation to participate in the desegregation of central city school districts, and
the irresistible trend back toward resegregation began. 5
B. The Role of Residential Segregation
An exclusive focus on the decades of state mandated racial separation in the
schools, subsequent resistance to the Brown mandate, and an exploration of the
numerous school desegregation lawsuits and the Supreme Court's evolving view
of them, does not fuly explain the segregated and inferior nature of our public
primary and secondary schools today. It is not just that many states mandated
racial segregation in the public schools, and that many states, state actors and
localities resisted implementation of the Brown mandate. At the same time, many
public and private sort." Id. For an in-depth examination of the history of racial discrimination
in California schools, see IRVING G. HENDRICK, THE EDUCATION OF NON-WHrrEs IN
CALIFORNIA, 1849-1970 (1977).
S See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 77, at 444-55.
2See BROOKS, CARRASCO & SELMI, supra note 69, at 12.
S3 ee generally MARK WHITMAN, THE IRONY OF DESEGREGATION LAW 1955-1995
(1998).
" See Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET' REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 8 (1996) ("By
1970, the schools in the South, which had been almost totally segregated in the early 1960s,
were far more desegregated than those in any other region.").
85 See id. at 22; Orfield & Yun Study, supra note 15, at 6. The authors noted that:
[A]fter the termination of court orders.., the school districts would be declared 'unitary'
and free of all taint of discrimination. Once that happened, school boards were free to
make decisions that had the effect of creating unequal opportunities for minority students
unless civil rights lawyers could prove that they had intended to discriminate, a standard
that is virtually impossible to meet.
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states and subdivisions thereof also engaged in a pattern of actions that: (1) helped
to create the suburbs; (2) helped to ensure that the newly created suburbs were
virtually all-White; and (3) contributed to residential segregation within our urban
areas, now increasingly distinct from the suburbs. All of these actions in turn
contributed to the racial segregation in our primary and secondary schools
throughout metropolitan areas. Thus, a narrow focus only upon segregation in
education itself leaves out another exceedingly important co-variable, that is,
residential segregation. Schools and neighborhoods operate like two-way,
interdependent ratchets, each acting on and transforming the other.
For example, most states and their subdivisions base school district
attendance requirements on residential boundaries notwithstanding the fact that
most "neighborhoods in the United States are segregated by class and race. 86 So
in most instances, students attend a public school in the school district in which
they reside.87 Because where one lives tends to dictate where one's children will
attend school, the types of school choices that are available to many consumer-
parents are constrained.8 This can have deleterious consequences. Indeed, this
was explicitly recognized in the Supreme Court of Connecticut's landmark Sheff
v. O'Neil 9 decision. In ruling that the state had violated a state constitutional
mandate requiring a substantially equal educational opportunity for all public
school children, the court made the following observation:
The state has nonetheless played a significant role in the present concentration of
racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system. Although
intended to improve the quality of education and not racially or ethnically
motivated, the districting statute that the legislature enacted in 1909... is the
single most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial
and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system .... The districting
86 See Molly McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promise and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAw AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 98 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).87 McUsic describes public school residence requirements in the following manner:
In almost all states, school districts are required to educate all the students whose parents or
guardians live within the geographic boundaries. Usually students are permitted to attend
other public districts for the price of tuition. However, admissions decisions are left to the
discretion of the district, which is legally obligated first to meet the needs of the students
living within its borders. As a result, the number of students permitted to transfer is limited.
Id. at 97-98 (endnote omitted).
88 Caroline M. Hoxby has explained how residence and access to schools are interrelated.
Her view is that "[h]ouseholds choose among public school districts by choosing a residence.
The degree to which households can exercise this form of choice depends heavily on the
number, size, and residence patterns of the school districts in the area centered around their
jobs." CAROLINE M. HOxBY, EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL CHOICE: WHAT WE LEARN FROM THE
TRADrrIONAL FORMS OF SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Kennedy Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 97-09, 1997).
'9 678 A.2d 1267 (1996)..
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statute is of critical importance because it establishes town boundaries as the
dividing line between all school districts in the state.90
Consequently, to the extent that our neighborhoods, cities, and suburbs and are
racially segregated, so too, will be our schools.9'
Conversely, segregated schools also enhance and reify residential
segregation. This is the case because access to a particular type of public school
drives consumer decisionmaking about neighborhood and subsequent
homebuying decisions.92 That is, access to "quality" schools is consciously
factored into neighborhood and homebuying decisions.93 Educational quality is
often associated with an all-White educational environment. Stated slightly
differently, "families who benefit from sending their children to school with
members of a historically privileged racial group [desire to] maximize this
benefit."94 Thus, to the extent that predominantly minority schools are perceived
as inferior, parents with means will pay a premium to live in a neighborhood that
does not include minority families so that their children can have access to higher
"quality" schools. Under this version of the interdependent, two-way ratchet,
"quality" drives decisionmaking, "race" does not.
Now if we step back and look at the twentieth century with an emphasis on
residential segregation, we see that a variety of public and private factors have
combined to cause the high levels of residential segregation that we observe
today.95 But without the actions of governments, including the states and their
90 See id. at 1274. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the highest levels of residential
segregation are present between specific school districts rather than within the school districts
themselves. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, PUBLIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN METROPOLITAN
AREAS 20-21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6779, 1998).
9' See HoxBy, supra note 88, at 4 ("[L]ow income or minority households are the most
likely to be prevented from making reasonably optimal investments in their children's
schooling, because their ability to choose residences in more than one district may be severely
constrained by their budget or discrimination.").
92 The Supreme Court recognized this fact in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) ("People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are
located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the
patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods.").3See powell, supra note 74, at 756.
94 Carl Bankston III & Stephen J. Caldas, Majority African American Schools and Social
Injustice: The Influence of De Facto Segregation on Academic Achievement, 75 SOC. FORCES
535, 539 (1996).
9' These factors include: the actions of the federal government, see infra note 96; the
actions of the states and their political subdivisions as are discussed herein; the actions of
private organizations such as neighborhood "improvement" associations that
"prevent[ed] ... black entry and... maint[ained] ... the color line"; the actions of realtors,
banks, and other lending institutions; and finally, varied and sustained acts of violence and
intimidation. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 35 (1993). Other outstanding works in
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subdivisions, the ability for consumer-parents to exercise the "choices" described
above and to expect that those, choices would be protected over time simply
would not be possible.96 Thus, it is clear that the state and its subdivisions played
this field include: ROBERT WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETrO (1948), an early and important
examination of the causes of residential segregation with particular emphasis on the Great
Migration and racial segregation through World War II, and KENNETH T. JACKSON, THE
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985), a seminal
examination of suburbanization providing an extremely useful discussion of the federal
government's role in creating our predominately White suburbs.96 The actions of the federal government in this regard deserve special consideration.
Professor James Kushner has succinctly captured a few of the federal government's actions that
have created segregated cities and suburbs:
The Federal Government acted as a joint adventurer in the movement toward suburban
sprawl. The government guaranteed no-down-payment mortgages to veterans in order to
facilitate access to the newly-developed housing.... Only a limited number of Blacks
qualified for the veterans program as the policies of discrimination and segregation in the
armed forces resulted in greater numbers of Whites being eligible for Veterans
Administration (VA) benefits. Both the FHA and VA adopted policies which assured
segregated subdivisions. These policies, based on fallacious assumptions about the real
estate market, guaranteed that Blacks would remain in the central cities. In contrast,
Whites commenced their dramatic exodus to the suburbs.
JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPORARY RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 21-22 (1980)
(citation omitted). Kushner continued with respect to our highway system and the provision of
other federal grants:
Federal government encouragement of the development of all-white suburbs included
various policies in addition to the provision of mortgage financing.... The Interstate
Highway system, established by Congress, gave states generous grants to construct the
expressways necessary to fuel the increased level of out-migration. In addition, federal
grants for electric power, open space, water and sewage facilities were made available to
discriminating suburban municipalities.
Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted). Kushner made the following assessment of a variety of federal
housing programs:
Government housing programs have consistently augmented segregation in
America.... The implementation of the[ ] early public housing programs resulted in the
clearance of archaic integrated neighborhoods and the development of new public housing
on a segregated basis. White projects were located in White neighborhoods while Black
projects were located in the Black ghetto .... Th[is] pattern did not change in the
1960's .... The implementation of homeownership programs... resulted in Whites
occupying new suburban tract homes while Blacks purchased existing homes in the central
city.... The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) central city programs encouraged the sale
of substandard homes, revitalized the housing market and facilitated White flight to the
suburbs with the concomitant continuance of racial concentration.
Id. at 30-35 (citations omitted). Finally, Kushner made this comment with respect to federal
communitydevelopment programs:
Community development efforts became major factors in the segregation process. This
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a major role in both segregating Blacks and Whites into distinct neighborhoods
within cities themselves and creating a city/suburban divide with a significant
racial component that in turn impacted the racial composition of our schools. 97
For example, early in the twentieth century, many cities passed racially
restrictive land use controls and zoning ordinances "which restricted city blocks
according to the occupant's race."98 The cities' power to pass land use restrictions
came directly from the state's police powers.99 After the Supreme Court ruled, in
Buchanan v. Warley' °° that racially restrictive zoning was a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, somewhat more covert means were
used to accomplish the same ends: racially restrictive covenants.' °' Racially
restrictive covenants were agreements that "ran with the land" and which often
covered large areas, binding future buyers and prohibiting them from
subsequently selling the property to Blacks or other undesirable racial groups.'0 2
While restrictive covenants are private contracts, they are effective only as a result
of an enforcement mechanism to punish transgressors which was supplied by the
state judiciary.'0 3 Judicial enforcement of these private schemes of racial
segregation leant the state's prestige and imprimatur to racial bigotry and
discrimination.' °4 It was not until 1948 that the Supreme Court struck down
judicial enforcement of such covenants as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, such covenants "continued to be used informally to
organize resistance to black entry."' 05
Other state policies contributed to current patterns of residential segregation.
For instance, as the suburbs grew, spurned on by a variety of governmental
incentives, they employed their legal authority to do so without Blacks. 6 The
national policy resulted in the uprooting of large communities of predominately Black,
poor, urban residents, followed by the sacrifice of their neighborhoods to freeways or
urban renewal.... Consistently, the relocatees were thrust into other racially concentrated,
substandard housing markets characterized by overcrowding and high rents. Both urban
renewal and racial covenants affected Black housing markets almost identically, except
urban renewal reclaimed land for the segregated, White neighborhood.
Id. at 37-39 (citations omitted). See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95; Kevin Fox
Gotham, Blind Faith in the Free Market. Urban Poverty, Residential Segregation, and Federal
Housing Retrenchment, 1970-1995,68 SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1998).
9' See generally KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 44-63.
98 KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 16 (citation omitted).
99 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).100 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
'0' Many cities continued to engage in racially restrictive zoning long after the Supreme
Court found such ordinances unconstitutional. See KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 16 n.36 (noting
that the "Palm Beach, Florida Ordinance was still on the books as late as 1958").
'
02 See KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 16-17 (citations omitted).
'o' See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1948).
"o See id. at 20.
'
05 See id. at 23; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95, at 188.
106 KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 44-50.
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suburbs used their power to regulate land uses in a manner that, while not
explicitly regulating use or occupancy on the basis of race, often had the very
same effect. As utilized in suburban areas, "euclidean"' 0 7 zoning, which restricted
land development to enhance taxes and property values by restricting population
densities, was an extremely effective means of creating and maintaining
predominantly White neighborhoods.'l8 At the same time, states regulated and
licensed private actors, such as real estate brokers and mortgage lenders who plied
their craft through racially discriminatory practices such as "racial steering,"' 0 9
"blockbusting," 1 0 and "redlining.""' State tax policies enhanced the power of the
suburbs at the expense of cities generally, and more specifically, created a tax
system guaranteeing superior financing of suburban schools." 2
These actions on the part of states and their subdivisions played a central role
in creating a separate housing market for Blacks and Whites that, along with
historic racial segregation in the schools and the inability to fulfil the Brown v.
Board of Education mandate, have led to substantial racial segregation in our
schools which we observe today. Thus, as we look back at the twentieth century,
107 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding municipal land use
restrictions as a valid exercise of the state's police powers).
'
08 See KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 44-52 ("[S]uburbs engaged in aggressive land use
control practices, designed to maintain their communities as all-white, middle class havens.").
'09 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95, at 99-100 (defining "racial steering" as realtors
often clandestine refusal to show minorities homes or rental properties in White
neighborhoods).
"
0 See id. at 37-38 (defining "blockbusting" as a churning process whereby realtors would
select promising transitional areas in White neighborhoods, sell to a few Black families and
then intentionally "increase white fears and spur black demand" for housing in the area using a
variety of techniques. As "whites gave up defending the neighborhood, black demand soared
and agents reaped substantial profits, because the new entrants were willing to pay prices much
higher than those previously paid by whites.").
Il "Redlining" is the practice of refusing to provide mortgages and other types of financial
services to homeowners living in defined areas, usually minority neighborhoods and
communities. See id. at 51-52. See generally Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. 353, 362
(1869) (finding that "[banks] are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation").
112 As James Kushner has explained:
The real property tax is the primary source of funding for schools and municipal services.
Ad valorem property taxes, based on the assessed valuation of land plus improvements,
have been a major catalyst fostering urban decay. Tax-ratable commercial and industrial
land uses contribute a large amount of revenue in proportion to their low demand for
services; while their suburban relocation has left the residents of the deteriorating housing
market without the means to pay for their expensive welfare and educational services. The
central city government is placed in an untenable position as assessed property valuations
decline in inverse proportion to escalating demand for services. This results in a
continually increasing tax burden on the remaining residents to sustain their welfare,
educational requirements and community services.
KUSHNER, supra note 96, at 59-60; see also McUsic, supra note 86, at 97-99.
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only a relatively brief pause punctuated the seemingly inexorable pull toward
racially segregated and unequal schools. The period of pause, from roughly the
mid 1960s to the late 1980s, was perhaps the only time during the century that
Black Americans experienced any sustained period of real improvement in the
staggering levels of racial segregation in primary and secondary schools." 3 This
period coincided with vigorous federal commitment to civil rights objectives,' 14
including vigorous executive enforcement of federal civil rights laws that
prohibited racial segregation in public schools and promoted desegregation and a
tendency on the part of the federal judiciary to side with minority plaintiffs in
school desegregation cases."' During this period, federal judicial oversight
(others would say "control") of schools districts was common. As the control of
many public school districts has returned to localities and desegregation orders
have been terminated, racial segregation in many public school districts has
increased."16
C. The Present: Percentage Plans in Context
Given this background of governmental action furthering a system of
segregation, it may seem curious that percentage plans have been advanced in
Texas, California, and Florida. Several factors have come together to produce this
phenomenon. First, there is a political and social desire for some level of racial
diversity in public higher education. Second, race-conscious affirmative action
cannot be used in college admissions in each state, albeit for disparate reasons.
Third, Blacks and Latinos do not score as well on the SAT (a traditional indicator
of college preparedness) and other standardized tests as do Whites and Asians.17
Thus, if the SAT were relied upon to determine admission to state colleges and
universities, those institutions will not be as racially diverse as they once were.1 '
Fourth, high school grade point average is also a traditional indicator of college
preparedness, and a high GPA, whatever the school, tends to evidence effort and
academic achievement relative to a student's peer group at the same high school.
Fifth, many high schools are heavily racially segregated because most
metropolitan areas are racially segregated. So an admissions plan that selects
students based on their grade point average will tend to yield a more racially
diverse pool than an admission plan that relies on the SAT. Sixth, such a plan is
:13 See generally Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 1-22.
.4 See id.
11S See id.
6 See generally id. at 1-22, 53-71.
:
7 See Nettles, supra note 7, at 105 ("[Tlhe average performance of African Americans
and Hispanics on standardized tests is substantially lower than that of whites and Asians."); see
also NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, LATINO EDUCATION: STATUS AND PROSPECTS, STATE OF
HISPANIC AMERICA 1998 72 (1998) (reporting that by "1997, the [average total SAT] scores for
Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics increased to 1052, 857, and 934, respectively").11 See id. See generally infra notes 128, 149.
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also facially race-neutral, thus diminishing many of the constitutional problems
associated with racial classifications." 9 Finally, Blacks (and to a lesser extent
Latinos), experience high levels of residential racial segregation, both within the
cities and the suburbs.2 Since residence tends to dictate school attendance, our
public schools are also largely racially segregated in both urban and suburban
areas, and the level of racial segregation in public schools is increasing rather than
decreasing. 121 Most importantly, racially segregated schools are inherently
"
9 See infra Part Ill.
120 Blacks experience a higher degree of residential racial segregation than any other racial
group in the United States. Professor Nancy Denton has described Black Americans as
"hypersegregated," that is, they are "unevenly distributed across neighborhoods; they are highly
isolated within very racially homogenous neighborhoods and their neighborhoods are clustered
to form contiguous ghettoes, centralized near central business districts and away from suburban
schools and jobs, and concentrated in terms of population density and spatial area compared to
white neighborhoods." Nancy Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between
Residential Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN L. REv. 795, 798 (1996); see also
Diana Jean Schemo, Persistent Racial Segregation Mars Suburbs' Green Dream, N.Y. TIMES,
March 17, 1994, at Al (examining residential segregation in suburban areas and reporting that
"lily-white communities tend not to become integrated but to remain largely lily-white, with the
addition of well-defined minority precincts").
The situation with respect to Latinos is somewhat more complicated. "Hispanics" as a
group experience moderate levels of residential racial segregation. See Denton, supra, at 800.
However, within that group, Black racial status is a key variable. Professor Denton has
observed, with respect to Hispanics and residential segregation, that intergroup variations are
significant. Thus, among "Hispanics, those who identify racially as black or as 'Spanish race'
are more segregated than those who identify as white. Cities with a Hispanic population that is
largely or historically Puerto Rican have higher Hispanic versus non-Hispanic white
segregation scores than those dominated by Mexicans or Cubans." Id. (citations omitted); see
also Emily Rosenbaum, The Influence of Race on Hispanic Housing Choices: New York City,
1978-1987, 32 URB. AFF. REv. 217, 234 (1996) (her results "provide evidence of the processes
of social and market forces that isolate not only Anglos from African-Americans and Hispanics
but also, increasingly, African-Americans and black Hispanics from all persons of nonblack
status"). See generally Anna M. Santiago, Trends in Black and Latino Segregation in the Post-
Fair Housing Era: Implications for Housing Policy, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 131, 131 (1996) (finding
that "Latino segregation from Anglos has increased in a number of metropolitan areas during
the past 20 years").
.2 For example, Orfield and Yun found four trends that currently dominate our social
landscape. First, schools in the American South are resegregating. Second, Latino students are
increasingly segregated. Third, although there is an increasingly large number of Black and
Latino students attending suburban public schools, the suburbs are residentially segregated,
which does not bode well for desegregated education in those areas. Finally, while "all racial
groups except whites experience considerable diversity in their schools ... whites are remaining
in overwhelmingly white schools even in regions with very large non-white enrollments." See
Orfield & Yun Study, supra note 15, at 3; see also Russell W. Rumberger & Douglas J. Wilms,
Achievement Gap in California High Schools, 14 EDuC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYsIs, 377,
392 (1992) (examining racial segregation in California high schools and finding that
"segregation was large in the state as a whole and within each of the six largest school
districts").
1756 [Vol. 62:1729
THE PARADOX OF "PERCENTAGE PLANS"
inferior because they are racially segregated. 122
Residential segregation concentrates not just race, but also poverty, which in
turn is associated with a variety of extraordinarily detrimental effects on the
inhabitants of minority neighborhoods, including lowering educational attainment
at the schools that minority group members attend. 123 As Professors Massey and
Denton have so powerfully maintained, "the organization of public schools
around geographical catchment areas... reinforces and exacerbates the social
isolation that segregation creates in neighborhoods. By concentrating low-
achieving students in certain schools, segregation creates a social context within
which poor performance is standard and low expectations predominate.' '124 The
sad and continuing reality is that, as a general matter, schools that are racially
segregated-by this I mean minority concentrated schools-are inferior to
predominantly White schools across a wide variety of indicia, including lower
educational achievement.12 Thus, schools with high minority concentrations
experience an overall lack of material resources, lower standards for certification
and compensation of teachers, higher drop-out rates, lower rates of college
attendance, a dearth of advanced placement classes and up-to-date facilities,
lower parental involvement, and educationally adverse peer group behaviors. 126
Residential segregation thus amplifies school segregation and concentrates
poverty, both of which in turn create, foster, and maintain "concentrated
'
22 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (1996) (interpreting the Connecticut state
constitution to find that "the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school
system deprives schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational opportunity"). See generally
powell, supra note 20.
123 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95, at 141 ("[B]ecause poverty is associated with
poor educational performance[,] segregation also concentrates educational disadvantage."); see
also Orfield & Yun Study, supra note 15; Douglas S. Massey et al., Migration, Segregation,
and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty, 59 AMER. Socio. REV. 425, 442 (1994)
("[G]eographically concentrated poverty ultimately stems from racially segregated U.S.
housing markets.").
12 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95, at 141; see also Rumberger & Wilms, supra
note 121, at 392 ("Given that White students, on average, come from more advantaged
backgrounds and have higher levels of achievement, the proportion of White students in a
school may be critical to determining the climate of a school and its levels of teaching and
nonteaching resources.").
121 Carl L. Bankston & Stephen J. Caldas, The American School Dilemma: Race and
Scholastic Performance, 38 Soc. Q. 423, 428 (1997) ("[R]esidence is the basis of school
assignment .... This means that residential social isolation, rather than social isolation in
schools, may account for the comparatively weak performance of students in minority
concentration schools."). See generally Bankston & Caldas, supra note 94.
126 See powell, supra note 20, at 385-91. See generally Applied Research Center, Facing
the Consequences: An Examination of Racial Discrimination in U.S. Public Schools (2000), at
www.arc.org/erase/FrClintro.html (finding that on "every key indicator, from drop-out rates
and discipline rates to access to advanced placement courses and entrance to college, students
of color are at a serious disadvantage to their white counterparts").
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disadvantage" and educational inequality for minority students. 127 It was against
this complex and mutually reinforcing reality, extant across our nation, that
Texas, California, and Florida created percentage plans ostensibly to reward hard
work and academic achievement in high school and to ensure some level of racial
diversity in public higher education.
IV. LEGAL ASPECTS OF PERCENTAGE PLANS: POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
Under current Supreme Court precedents, plaintiffs have been successful in
striking down race-conscious preferential affirmative action plans. The state of
affirmative action jurisprudence raises an interesting question when applied to
percentage plans: might a percentage plan survive a constitutional challenge in
this climate? Let us examine perhaps the most obvious challenge that might be
made against a percentage plan; one that might come from a White student
hailing from an academically strong and predominantly White suburban high
school in a state where a percentage plan admissions system for state colleges and
universities operates. In this high school, classes are challenging, many advanced
placement courses are offered, and the students are well prepared and compete
intensely for grades. The vast majority of the students attending this high school
come from families whose income equals or exceeds the area median. In this high
school, our hypothetical plaintiff has earned superior but not outstanding grades,
and her grade point average places her just outside of the top four, ten, 12.5, or
twenty percent of her class. Let us also make our hypothetical plaintiff an
excellent test taker. Let us assume that she scores in the top two percent of all test
takers statewide on the SAT.
Now let us now shift our vision away from the academically strong suburban
high school to its companion twenty-five miles away located in an urban area, but
within the same metropolitan region as the suburban high school discussed above.
In this high school, the students are predominantly Black and Hispanic. The vast
majority of the students attending this high school come from families whose
income is below the area median. In this high school, classes are far from
challenging, few advanced placement courses are offered, and many students lack
adequate preparation to do demanding high school work because of a weak
"feeder" middle school. Let us assume further that few of the students graduating
in the top four, ten, 12.5, or twenty percent of this high school class were also in
the top two percent of all test takers statewide on the SAT. 28
S27 see Lauren i. Krivo et al., Race, Segregation and the Concentration of Disadvantage:
1980-1990,45 SOC. PROBS. 61, 61, 76 (1998) ("[H]igher levels of racial residential segregation
are associated with greater concentration of Black disadvantage but generally have a negligible
or opposite effect for Whites. That is, in some cases greater segregation actually benefits Whites
by geographically buffering them from much higher levels of Black disadvantage.").
12 lIt is c ear that there is a 'lest score gap" between Blacks and Hispanics, on the one
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Styled along classic "reverse discrimination" lines, our challenger might
argue that "less qualified" Black and Hispanic students are being admitted to the
state university system while she, a White student, is not. Under this argument,
percentage plans provide Blacks and Hispanics with a preference for admission to
or eligibility for state colleges and universities that is denied to Whites. This view
is premised on the theory that our White student, who ranked near but not in the
top of her more competitive suburban class, would have ranked in the top of her
class in a less competitive, urban high school. Moreover, our challenger might
assert that under the previous admissions system (only very recently jettisoned),
which weighed performance on a standardized entrance examination, such as the
SAT, heavily in the admissions determination, she would likely have been
admitted to the state school. Under the current system, her admissions prospects
are dimmed and those of Blacks and Hispanics are favored at her expense.
A. Potential Equal Protection Challenges
How would the current Supreme Court's Equal Protection doctrine be
applied in such a challenge? Our plaintiff would likely begin by arguing
percentage plans are animated by a discriminatory purpose and are therefore a
hand, and Whites and Asian Americans on the other. See supra notes 7, 117. What is less clear
is the cause or causes of that gap. Debate with respect to this issue has at times been furious.
The 1994 publication of Richard J. Hermstein and Charles Murray's book, The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, which argued that Blacks' and Whites'
disparate performance on IQ (and SAT) tests could be explained at least in part by reference to
"genetic differences" between the two groups, ignited a firestorm of controversy. RICHARD J.
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE
IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). In response, many commentators argued persuasively that the causes
of the test score gap could be more readily understood as a function of social and economic
inequality rather than as a result of some objectively measurable (and heritable) notion of
"intelligence." See, e.g., THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1994); CHARLES S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN:
CRACKING THE BELL CURVE MYTH (1996); INTELLIGENCE, GENES, AND SUCCESS: SCIENTISTS
RESPOND TO THE BELL CURVE (Bernie Devlin et al. eds., 1997). For the purposes of my project,
I will assume that there are a variety of causes of the test score gap, at least one of which is the
racially segregated and inferior educations that many Blacks and Hispanics receive. See
generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds.,
1998). From this perspective, I am less concerned with performing an in-depth analysis of each
of the causes of diminished SAT performance than pointing to what such performance
represents. My view is that lower Black and Hispanic performance on tests, such as on the
SAT, reflect the racially segregated and consequently inferior nature of the education that such
students often receive. See generally Caldas & Bankston, supra note 94. That is to say that
racially segregated public schools are inferior because they concentrate poverty and associated
ills and that many students attending such schools suffer diminished educational achievement as
a result. Given that, my view is simply that the state has an obligation to attempt to desegregate
and improve the education that those students receive.
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 9 From
our plaintiff's perspective, percentage plans' discriminatory purpose is the desire
to advantage Blacks and Hispanics at the expense of Whites and Asians. This
view argues that the state has replaced a race-conscious, preferential affirmative
action plan with a race-neutral yet still preferential affirmative action plan-the
same discriminatory purpose animates them both. At bottom, the plaintiff would
argue, the purpose of the prior race-conscious affirmative action plan was to
admit less qualified minority group members, and the purpose of the current race-
neutral affirmative action plan is to admit less qualified minority group members.
The new plan simply uses a race-neutral means to achieve the same ends-ends
that are presumptively unconstitutional under Richmond v. Croson130 and
Adarand v. Pena.3 '
Moreover, our plaintiff would further support her claim by suggesting that the
state cannot escape heightened judicial review simply by disguising its
discriminatory purpose through race-neutral means.'3 2 It is true that the Court has
expressed a disinclination to examine the motives of state actors. 3 3 But the Court
has been willing to pierce the veil of facial neutrality and find covert
discriminatory purpose where the "conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount
for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration,"1 34 that the action is
solely concerned with discrimination on the basis of race.
Along these lines, our plaintiffs view is that percentage plans reflect
invidious, race-based discrimination for at least two, interrelated reasons. First,
there is little question that percentage plans, as a method for determining
admission to state colleges and universities, would not have been adopted had the
previous system of race-conscious preferential affirmative action been
sustainable. 35 It is only in the absence of race-conscious, preferential affirmative
action that "the next best thing"--percentage plans---become attractive. 3 6 And
'
2 9 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,236 (1976).130 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
13 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
"'
32 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241 ("[T]his is not to say that the necessary
discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute .... ."); see
also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).133 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("It is difficult or impossible for
any court to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of
legislators."); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 641 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's subjective analysis into the motivation behind the Burke County,
Georgia at-large electoral system for electing members of its governing Board of
Commissioners was misplaced).
114 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,341 (1960).
135 See Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669,
687 (1998) [hereinafter Issacharoff] (explaining that the end of affirmative action in Texas
forced the Texas legislature to "reduce admissions standards" including using methods such as
percentage plans).
136On this view, percentage plans function as a substitute or proxy for a prior race-
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what exactly is the state trying to do in implementing these plans? Our plaintiffs
response is that the state is intentionally attempting to diminish the number of
White students in state colleges and universities by enhancing Black and Hispanic
representation.' 37 From this perspective, the state action is taken "because of'
rather than "in spite of' its adverse effect on White citizens--embodying a state
ordained preference for Blacks and Hispanics over Whites.'38 Second, from our
plaintiffs perspective, the timing is evidence of motive. In states in which they
have been adopted, percentage plans come close on the heels of a rejection or
prohibition of race-conscious affirmative action. Our plaintiff would argue that
such a quick transition is indicative of the fact that the same discriminatory
purpose animates both the recently discarded race-conscious, preferential
affirmative action regime and the newly discovered race-neutral affirmative
action program.131
Finally, our plaintiff would also argue that percentage plans have a
discriminatory effect because a higher percentage of "less well qualified" Blacks
and Hispanics would be admitted through their operation instead of "better
qualified" White students (of which she is one). Thus, percentage plans would
have a discriminatory impact, functioning to admit more minority students with
lesser qualifications than White students with more impressive credentials.
Plaintiff's argument here is epitomized by the remarks made by one critic of
Florida's Talented 20 Program who stated that "the real argument ... is whether
minorities are entitled to positions in the state university system when there is a
nonminority applicant with better academic and other relevant credentials."'
40
While this argument would concede that evidence of disparate impact alone is
insufficient to state a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,141 it would
augment the assertion that percentage plans are animated by discriminatory
conscious preferential affirmative action program for determining admission to a state college
or university that is currently "off the table" either because of a judicial decree, constitutional
amendment, or an executive order. For example, Florida was very open about the fact that the
Talented 20 Program was a "means of furthering diversity" that replaced the explicit use of race
and ethnicity as a factor in admissions determinations. See Office of the Governor of Florida,
One Florida Summary--What does the One Florida Education Plan Actually Do?, at
http://www.myFlorida.com/myflorida/govemment/leam/one-florida/FloridaSummary.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2000). In fact, in one remark Governor Bush noted: "I hope that you'll get
a sense that what we're here to propose transcends the tired debate about affirmative action ....
[Tihe new initiative that we are unveiling today I believe will increase diversity in the
universities... without using policies that discriminate or pit one racial group against another."
The Newshour with Jim Lehrer: One Florida (PBS television broadcast, June 2, 2000) at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education/j an-juneO0/florida_6-2.html.
137 See supra note 8.
138 See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
139 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
140 See Bragg, supra note 8 (reporting the statements of Sam J. Yarger, Dean of the School
of Education at the University of Miami).
141 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
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purpose. Thus, evidence of discriminatory effect would help shift "the burden of
proof.., to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action.' 142
B. Responses to Equal Protection Arguments
What are we to make of our plaintiffs arguments? In a recent article,
Kathleen Sullivan suggested a variety of rationales for why a "reverse
discrimination" challenge to a "race-neutral affirmative action' 143 plan such as a
percentage plan would be likely to fail.44 First, she suggested that because the
government's goal in utilizing percentage plans is to enhance diversity, such
action is taken "despite, rather than because of, the effect on white interests,"
therefore there is no discriminatory purpose. 145 Second, Sullivan pointed out that
individual Whites will have a "difficult time showing that they lost any discrete
opportunity to a member of a racial minority group, the type of claim made by
Alan Bakke," that is, that such claims would be too generalized to survive
review. 4 6 Finally, she noted that the Constitution does not require any particular
type of admissions system, that is, that the state is free to alter its admissions
system to serve the goals of "geographic representation or class mobility.' ' 147 On
this view, there is no entitlement to a particular admissions system so that a
"group['s] share" of seats could not be reduced. 41
Sullivan is undoubtedly persuasive with respect to her second and third
assertions. There is no question that a reverse discrimination percentage plan
challenge would be significantly more difficult to mount from an evidentiary
perspective than a garden variety "Bakke-type" challenge where the litigation
"universe" is defined by the defendant's applicant pool, its admits, and its rejects
in a given admissions cycle. The difficulties are seemingly endless. For instance,
how is a determination to be made with respect to the appropriate qualifications
necessary for admission and success at a state college or university, that is to say,
how do we define "merit" for these purposes? Another difficulty that our plaintiff
would face is establishing the appropriate comparison group. Does one identify
an appropriate predominantly minority high school and compare it academically
to the plaintiff's high school, or should the plaintiff examine the records of a
variety of Black and Hispanic students admitted under a percentage plan, and
141 See id. at 241 (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
143 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative
Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2334-35 (2000); see also id. at 2333 (describing the Texas Ten
Percent plan as an "ostensibly race-neutral effort[ ] to increase minority representation in higher
education," that is, as a "race-neutral affirmative action" program).114 Kathleen Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039 (1998).145 See id. at 1050 (citation omitted).
116 See id. at 1052 (noting that "[a]mong alternative admission policies that are race-neutral
in form, no one in particular is constitutionally compelled over any other.").
147 id.
148 Id.
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compare them to the plaintiff's record? How exactly are high school records to be
compared such that the plaintiff can assert that the minority students are less "well
qualified" or "deserving" of admission to the state school than the plaintiff? How
would plaintiff begin to describe the appropriate baseline or academic
requirements that the state should adopt for admission to its colleges and
universities?
Perhaps our plaintiff would point to differences in performance on the SAT
between Black and Hispanic versus White and Asian test takers, which she would
argue, provide an objective, easily identifiable standard of "merit": Blacks and
Hispanics with lower test scores "got in," she had a higher test score but did not.
Such an argument assumes as a normative matter the propriety of the use of the
SAT in the admissions determination, that is, that there is a correlation between
high SAT scores and who should be admitted to college. This view holds that the
SAT is a good proxy for "merit" because it accurately measures scholastic
aptitude and can accurately predict scholastic success, and thus should be used in
the admissions process notwithstanding any adverse impact on minority group
members. The problem, of course, is that these assumptions are heavily
contested.149
Leaving aside for a moment the debate about whether such test scores should
determine access to college in the first instance, "limitations notwithstanding,
achievement test performance remains an important measure of student ability
and school performance."'' ° My view is that Blacks' and Latinos' performance
on standardized tests is reflective of the fact that the education they receive is very
often racially segregated and therefore of inferior quality.'' The nature and
149 See, e.g., Claude Steele, Expert Testimony in Defense of Affirmative Action, in SEX,
RACE, & MERIT: DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 124 (Faye
J. Crosby & Cheryl VanDeVeer eds., 2000). The author argues that:
[S]tandardized admissions tests such as the SAT, the ACT, and the LSAT are of limited
value in evaluating 'merit' or determining admissions qualifications of all students, but
particularly for African American, Hispanic, and American Indian applicants for whom
systematic influences make these tests even less diagnostic of their scholastic potential.
Id.; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998);
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996).
150 A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 346 (Gerald David Jaynes &
Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989); supra notes 128, 149 and accompanying text.
' ' Professor Gary Orfield has argued that racially segregated schools depress student
achievement because racial segregation concentrates poverty:
Though we usually think of segregation in racial and ethnic terms, it's important to also
realize that the spreading segregation has a strong class component. When African-
American and Latino students are segregated into schools where the majority of students
are non-white, they are very likely to find themselves in schools where poverty is
concentrated. This is of course not the case with segregated white students, whose
2001] 1763
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
quality of the education that many Blacks and Latinos receive, which is often
racially segregated and unequal, systematically disadvantages them across a
variety of indicators, including their performance on standardized tests.' An
equally persuasive argument is that the use of test scores in the admissions
process protects the prevailing status quo, rewards inherited privilege and thus
does "violence to fundamental principles of equity and 'finctional merit' in its
distribution of opportunities for admission to higher education."' 53 Consequently,
it is just as easy to see our hypothetical plaintiffs position as an argument that
seeks to "protect the turf' of the privileges that members of her particular group
had enjoyed under the previous admissions system, as one grounded in objective
and unassailable notions of merit.
With respect to Dean Sullivan's first argument, however, we must pause. Her
assertion with respect to discriminatory purpose in the context of facially race-
neutral governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause is at least open to
question. Even if one rejects the notion that percentage plans were implemented
intentionally to decrease the number of Whites attending state colleges and
universities, one could well argue that governmental action intentionally taken to
advance the interests of one group is necessarily also taken, at least in part, to
retard the interests of another.'54 Leaving aside for a moment questions with
majority-white schools almost always enroll high proportions of students from the middle
class. This is a crucial difference, because concentrated poverty is linked to lower
educational achievement. School level poverty is related to many variables that effect a
school's overall chance to successfully educating students, including parent education
levels, availability of advanced courses, teachers with credentials in the subject they are
teaching, instability of enrollment, dropouts, untreated health problems, lower college-
going rates and many other important factors.
Orfield & Yun Study, supra note 15, at 3.
152 For instance, Bankston and Caldas found that "black students in white schools do better
than black students in racially mixed or in predominantly black schools" and suggest that
"residential social isolation" may be an explanation for that finding. Bankston & Caldas, supra
note 125, at 428. Moreover, Professor Gary Orfield has argued that the relative low levels of
Asian residential segregation may explain the academic performance of many Asian American
students. See GARY ORFIELD, AsIAN STUDENTS AND MULTIETHNIC DESEGREGATION 2 (The
Harvard Project on School Desegregation, 1994); THE STATE OF AsIAN PACIFIC AMERICA:
TRANSFORMING RACE RELATIONS, LEAP AsIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE
5 (Paul M. Ong ed., 2000) (noting that, in contrast to Blacks and Hispanics, Asian Americans
"are the least residentially segregated minority group"). Professor Orfield's view is that "in
general, Asians are far less likely that African Americans and Latinos to confront segregation
either by race of [sic] poverty. Since racial and economic segregation are very strongly related
to lower levels of school academic achievement, this means that most Asian students attend
more competitive schools." GARY ORFIELD, ASIAN STUDENTS AND MULTIETHNIC
DESEGREGATION 2 (1994).
153 See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 149, at 957 (citation omitted).
154 See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 143, at 2348 ("[R]ead in conjunction with Feeney,
Croson and Adarand establish that a 'discriminatory purpose' exists whenever the govemment
selects a course of action at least in part 'because of its adverse-or beneficial-effects upon a
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respect to mixed motivations and concerns about burden shifting,' 55
discriminatory purpose would be established and strict scrutiny review would be
triggered if the plaintiff could show that the state's desire to achieve racial
diversity was "a motivating factor in the decision" to implement a percentage
plan.'56 Of course, even if one were to concede that a court would apply strict
scrutiny to percentage plans, this would not necessarily dictate a finding that such
plans are unconstitutional. At least one commentator has suggested that, although
race-neutral affirmative action programs, such as percentage plans, would be
subjected to strict scrutiny, they would likely survive such scrutiny. 57
Professor Forde-Mazrui has suggested that race-neutral affirmative action
plans will be subjected to strict scrutiny because:
Strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is triggered by a law motivated
by a racially discriminatory purpose, regardless of whether the law employs an
express racial classification or is race-neutral on its face. As the Supreme Court's
affirmative action cases establish, the purpose to benefit racial minorities is a
discriminatory purpose. Thus, when a state school intentionally seeks to admit
minority students through the use of race-neutral criteria.., it has acted with a
discriminatory purpose.158
Professor Forde-Mazrui's position, however, is that race-neutral affirmative
action programs should survive such review precisely because they are race-
neutral. This view sees the Court's affirmative action doctrine as an admonition
against the effects of "racial classifications-as means-because of the harmful
effects such means have both in the immediate impact of their operation and in
their consequences for society at large."' 59 From this perspective, the real evil the
Court is attempting to "smoke out" through the use of strict scrutiny in affirmative
action cases is the types of injuries created by the very operation of racial
classifications such as "reinforcing racial stereotypes" and "exacerbating racial
tensions."' 6 Because race-neutral affirmative action carries a lesser likelihood of
causing such injuries directly, there is less reason for the Court to strike down a
governmental program where it is animated by a desire to remedy societal
discrimination.' 6' The theory here is that given its perniciousness, remedying
societal discrimination is a compelling governmental interest, if race-neutral
racial oup.").
55See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,270-71,271 n.21 (1977).
"' See id. at 265-66, 270 ("When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference [for official actions] is no longer
justified.").
157 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 143, at 2336.
j5s See id. at 2333.59 See id. at 2356-57.
'60 See id. at 2357.
161 See id. at 2352.
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means are used, because such means are "sufficiently unobjectionable.', 162 From
this perspective, the answer to our hypothetical plaintiffs objection is that the
state's desire to achieve racial diversity through a race-neutral means, such as a
percentage plan, simply does not amount to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 163
But an additional major response to our hypothetical plaintiff is founded on
an observation of the current political reality. The fact that percentage plans are
race-neutral and reward scholastic achievement as measured by comparison with
a student's immediate peer group, has allowed enough of a political coalition to
form to support creation of the programs, and perhaps even to insulate them
politically from judicial override. I think it likely that, even under the Court's
current disapproving approach to affirmative action, our hypothetical plaintiffs
reverse discrimination challenge to a percentage plan would fail because of the
political environment that has generated such plans. The explicit abandonment or
prohibition of race-conscious affirmative action in some jurisdictions has not
ended the desire for both racially diverse and academically solid public college
and university classes, and there is significant political pressure to prevent those
institutions' resegregation.' 64 Using percentage plans, "merit" will be assured by
basing admission decisions on the student's high school record as opposed to their
performance on a single examination-by many lights an eminently fairer
indicator of effort, achievement, and future academic promise. 16 Such a system
thus rewards a record of academic achievement and treats all students with
similarly lofty class ranks in the state equally without regard to race. Along the
"merit" axis, then, percentage plans are a textbook example of formal notions of
equality.
Because percentage plans tie college and university admissions to an
extremely traditional and widely accepted indicia of merit-performance in high
school, it is simply less likely that the Court will find that they are
unconstitutional. 166 From the perspective of the real rather than the ideal,
162 See id. at 2353.
16' Dean Sullivan has put it even more bluntly: "It is simply not the case that uncovering a
purpose to increase racial diversity, in the absence of racially discriminatory means,
simultaneously reveals a proxy policy to be a 'subterfuge' for discrimination against whites."
Sullivan, supra note 144, at 1048.
'64See Jeffery Rosen, Damage Control: The Unintended Consequences of Proposition
209 Have Forced Some of its Stauncher Supporters to Reconsider. But is it too late?, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 23 & Mar. 2, 1998 at 58, 64 (reporting that the "pressure [to maintain diversity]
comes from minority voters and the candidates who court them, who believe that the
institutions training California's leaders should reflect the state's population, and from the
students themselves").
'
65 See supra Part I.
'"See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 20 (1993) (arguing that the socialization process
through which Supreme Court justices are chosen "all but ensures their sympathy toward
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percentage plans, with their purported emphasis on "merit," provide a "big
umbrella" approach to affirmative action and function as an attractive diversity
enhancement mechanism that many holding significantly differing views on
affirmative action can endorse. "Diversity," as a broad goal when pursued by
race-neutral means that emphasize effort and educational achievement, is a theme
which many Americans can support as a political matter because of the
widespread acceptance of fairness as a bedrock American value., 67
Of course, this does not mean that progressives and civil rights activists have
embraced percentage plans. Many have not. 68 Race-neutral affirmative action
mechanisms such as percentage plans have appeared to fill the vacuum created in
the wake of the absence of Bakke-style affirmative action. As progressives have
pointed out, their very attraction--race-neutrality-also makes them a less
dependable mode through which to deliver the highest number of Blacks and
Hispanics to higher education. 69 Progressives have wisely and correctly pointed
out that percentage plans do little to enhance racial diversity in graduate education
and have often had a deleterious effect on the numbers of Blacks and Hispanics
enrolled at the more "elite" campuses within state university systems. 7°
Progressives have also noted that without adequate recruitment, outreach,
application information, and improved access to advanced placement courses and
other education supports, percentage plans will fail to provide both racial diversity
and equal educational opportunity. 7'
But the discussion about percentage plans -from the progressive camp has
suffered from a certain poverty of vision. The stakes at play in this discussion are
exceedingly high; in putting forward percentage plans, the state has consciously
selected a method for diversifying its colleges and universities that utilizes the
segregation of its secondary schools to achieve that end. In so doing, it asks us to
ignore its role in contributing to the segregated and inferior conditions below. To
allow this moment to pass without comment is to risk absolving the state, at least
majoritarian values").
167 For example, in an examination of racial attitudes among Whites, Lawrence Bobo,
James R. Kluegel, and Ryan A. Smith, reported that White support of affirmative action
policies varied significantly based upon the type of policy at issue. The authors suggest that
policies "that aim mainly to increase the human capital attributes of blacks are comparatively
popular," but that policies that "lean toward achieving equal outcomes, [or] preferences for
minorities that ignore merit considerations" will be opposed. Lawrence Bobo et al., Laissez-
Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology, in RACIAL
ATrmuDEs IN THE 1990's: CoNTINurrY AND CHANGE 27 (Steven A. Tuch & Jack K. Martin
eds., 1997).
161 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5; see also Bragg, supra note 8 (noting
Black leaders' concern that the "plan would cripple college admissions of blacks").
169 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RGHTs, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that percentage plans are
"an ineffective replacement program when compared with ... previous affirmative actionpolictoiesi).
See Berry, supra note 4, at A48.
171 See id.; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5.
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symbolically, of its past actions and the concomitant responsibility for current
harm.
Progressives and civil rights activists, back on their heels in a defensive
stance, have engaged in a dialogue that has essentially urged two approaches: that
race-conscious preferential affirmative action be restored, or that race-neutral
affirmative action, which has lately taken the form of percentage plans, function
more effectively to guarantee the same level of minority representation
throughout state higher education as had obtained in an earlier era. I agree
wholeheartedly with both of these rhetorical positions. But political pressure
exerted against the resegregation of institutions of higher education is not the
same as political pressure exerted against the resegregation of primary and
secondary education, which is accelerating. 172 My view is that, properly
reconceived, the question should not be whether percentage plans yield the same
result as had obtained in an earlier period. The more fundamental question is
whether percentage plans are an unconscionable attempt to remedy one evil by
employing the worst features of another. This moment, then, is a fitting occasion
for a reassessment of the deeply segregated and unequal state of our nation's
secondary schools and the state's role in creating this reality. Only then can we
ask: where do we go from here?
V. PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE AS THE
GUARANTOR OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
The irony of percentage plans is that they seek to create racial diversity while
assuming and relying on racial segregation. However, percentage plans also
provide the state with a unique opportunity. My view is that percentage plans
represent a recognition of the state's responsibility for primary and secondary
education's failure to serve Black and Hispanic children. Out of this recognition
must come responsibility, and the state must recognize that the segregated and
inferior conditions I have discussed above must be ameliorated. But why should
the state do anything? For the moment, let us assume that the state's actions that
have helped to create the present reality would not be recognized as violating the
United States Constitution, as it has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, such that a federally enforceable obligation to ameliorate the
present conditions might arise. 173 But if that is the case, why then should the state
172 See Orfield & Yun Study, supra note 15, at 5.
173 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1972)
(holding that education is not a fundamental right). This, of course, does not mean that I would
not make such an argument in another context. Indeed, in many instances state law has been
interpreted to require that all students be provided with an adequate or equal education. See, e.g,
James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529,
534-35 (1999). It may well be that state law would require many states to undertake the kind of
policy prescriptives that I and others recommend. See, e.g., powell, supra note 20. My project
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take any affirmative step toward amelioration if it is neither involved in nor fears
litigation?
The answer is that states are not simply one-dimensional entities existing only
to be sued and to zealously defend their interests in a court of law. Instead,
government should be understood as an avenue or vessel of the good life, as a
guarantor, inter alia, of baseline notions of equality. As Bruce Ackerman and
Anne Alstott have recently urged, "the central task of government is to guarantee
genuine equality of opportunity."'174 If, in a state of nature, we ceded some of our
liberty as independent and fully autonomous individuals to create a government,
we did so for the betterment of all, for the fulfillment of equality. 175 This does not
mean that state government must supply or guarantee equal outcomes, including
equal income or equal wealth. Instead, the state should provide a baseline level of
"means-regarding" equality.176 That is, every person in the state should have the
same opportunity to generate the same income, the same wealth, and the same
opportunities for advancement and personal fulfillment-the same good life.177
In our twenty-first century knowledge and information-based society, an
equal and effective education is an absolutely essential precondition for achieving
that equal opportunity for the good life. 78 But one's education cannot be equal
here, however, is to argue that states have an obligation and responsibility, independent of court
order and crystallized by percentage plans, that requires them to pursue a course of racial and
socioeconomic desegregation of residential areas and public secondary schools.
174 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOCIr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 4 (1999).
17 See RONALD DwORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
1 (2000) ("No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all
those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.").176 See DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 66-67 (1981) (providing the following example
of "[m]eans-regarding equal opportunity [as] [t]wo persons, j and k, have equal opportunities
for X if each has the same instruments for attaining X") (citations omitted).
177 Ralph Waldo Emerson's articulation of this concept is strikingly apt: "the genius of our
country our true policy,-opportunity. Opportunity of civil rights, of education, of personal
power, and not the less of wealth; doors wide open.... Let them compete, and success to the
strongest, the wisest and the best." RALPH W. EMERSON, The Fortune of the Republic, in
MISCELLANIES 541 (Edward E. Emerson ed., 1968).
178 A recent Department of Labor study examining future employment trends was
emphatic. The study, which continually stressed the impact of education on labor market
outcomes, reported that the:
Demand for higher-skilled employees is a 50-year trend that has become increasingly
important. Where strength and manual dexterity used to be enough to ensure employment
and a comfortable standard of living, more jobs now and in the future will require verbal
and mathematical, as well as organizational and interpersonal, [sic] skills. Emerging
technologies, globalization, and the information revolution are also increasing demand for
high-tech skills.
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FTUREWORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR
WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 77 (1999). Workers who are insufficiently skilled to compete in
the twenty-first century workplace will be at an extreme disadvantage. Indeed, another section
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and effective if it is materially inferior and racially segregated. And under our
current system, equal opportunity is denied to large segments of whole classes of
people solely because of their race, class, and neighborhood. They are denied the
means necessary for achieving the good life which is the very essence of the
concept of equality.179 This is morally wrong and the state, as protector of liberty
and as guarantor of equality, has an obligation to make right such a wrong.
Indeed, such a position is not without precedent. In 1988, the Connecticut
State Department of Education issued a controversial report recommending that
the state take "collective responsibility" for desegregating Connecticut's public
schools.180 The report was explicit in condemning segregation: "the premise
underlying this report... is that segregation is educationally, morally and legally
wrong."' 8'1 Given such a premise, the only course of action was to desegregate the
state's public schools.'8 2 Moreover, there is explicit language in the state
constitution in each of our percentage plans states, Florida, Texas, and California,
emphasizing the importance and centrality of education to those states' citizens.
Indeed, education is such an important value in Florida and California that it has
been recognized as a "fundamental right."
For instance, the importance of education is clearly delineated in Article IX,
§ I of the Florida Constitution; it is of the highest importance.8 3 Article IX, § I
describes the "education of children" as a "fundamental value" and explicitly
places responsibility on the state to make "adequate provision for the education of
all children residing in the state."' 84 The newly amended version of that section
emphasizes the importance of a superior education in mandatory terms stating
that it is the "paramount duty" of the state to make "adequate provision ... for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that
allows students to obtain a high quality education... ,,'5
of the study cautioned that "African-Americans and Hispanics continue to lag behind in college
attendance. This means that these minority groups lack access to many of the skills that higher
education provides." Id. at ix.
179 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 175.
'80 See CONN. STATE DEPT. OF EDUC., A REPORT ON RACIAIJETHNIC EQUITY AND
DESEGREGATION IN CONNECTICUT'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11 (1988).
181 See id. at 1.
182 See id.
183 FLA. CONST. art. LX, § 1 (amended 1998).
184 See id.; see also Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles,
680 So. 2d 400, 409-10 (Fla. 1996) (Overton, J., concurring) ("[E]ducation is the key to
unlocking the door to freedom and keeping it open ... the right to an adequate education is a
fundamental right for the citizens of Florida under our Florida Constitution.").
181 See FLA. CONST. art. LX, § I (amended 1998); see also Volusia County v. Aberdeen at
Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 137 n.6 (Fla. 2000). Indeed, the language of Article IX is
so sweeping that the Florida Constitution Revision Commission noted that it "provides
guidance and standards for equal educational opportunities and provides a basis for legal
challenge if the system does not meet the standards." See Fla. Const. Revision Comm'n,
Analysis of Revisions for the November 1998 Ballot (Revision 6), at
[Vol. 62:17291770
THE PARADOX OF "'PER CENTA GE PLANS"
While education has not achieved the status of a fundamental right under the
Texas Constitution, the state's responsibility to provide for an adequate education
is clear. The Texas Constitution charges the state legislature with making
"suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of
public free schools."'16 This "suitability provision" is violated "if the Legislature
substantially default[s] on its responsibility such that Texas school children [are]
denied access to that education needed to participate fully in... opportunities
available in Texas."'8 7 In addition, the Texas Constitution explicitly provides that
"a general diffusion of knowledge [is] essential to the preservation of the liberties
and rights of the people."'
In California, education has achieved the status of a fundamental right. As
early as the 1920s, the California Supreme Court provided that "the education of
children of the state is an obligation which the state took over to itself by the
adoption of the constitution."'8 9 Under the California Constitution, the "general
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence" is "essential" and the legislature is
instructed to "encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." '' By the 1970s, the California
Supreme Court was willing to take the importance of education even further and
held that "the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society
warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest. '"'ag In the
1980s, the judiciary reaffirmed this notion emphasizing the fundamental nature of
education as promised in the California Constitution and noting that "a child's
public education is too important to be left to the budgetary circumstances and
decisions of individual families."' 92
As currently conceived, percentage plans operate against a background of
racial segregation and provide a remedy for lack of racial diversity in higher
education. But percentage plans are an inadequate remedy for the systematic
disadvantage associated with attending racially segregated schools; once a state
has recognized this disadvantage, it must do more. The foundation of the state's
obligation arises out of its own past actions, the effect that those past actions have
today, the state's own recognition of that fact, and from the state's role as a
guarantor of equality. The foundation of the state's obligation lies in the organic
http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/tabloid.htm (last visited July 18, 2000).
186 TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.17 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 736 (Tex. 1995).
181 TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
189 See Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist. of Inyo County, 193 Cal. 664,669 (1924).
'90 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
'91 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1). The central holding of
Serrano I was upheld in 1976. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano I1).
Later cases also confirmed that education was a fundamental interest. See, e.g., Butt v. State,
842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992); Steffes v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 176 Cal. App. 3d 739,
749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
192 Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35,43 (Cal. 1984).
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law which establishes the fundamental obligation to correct past wrongs, create an
equal and adequate educational system, and thereby create a more equal society.
Finally, advocates need to refocus their sights on solving this multi-valanced
problem. In political struggle, as in life, "you get what you settle for." With few
exceptions, the dialogue about percentage plans-often for reasons that are very
understandable-has had a narrow and defensive quality. 93 The issue as framed
by many progressives has been on preserving some level of racial diversity at
state colleges and universities and, increasingly, on enhancing educational
attainment in minority concentrated secondary schools.' 94 These are laudable and
exceedingly important goals. But to my mind, they will never come to pass
without a sustained focus brought to bear in the political arena that emphasizes
the segregated and inferior nature of minority concentrated schools and that
demands an equal and desegregated educational environment, which is a
predicate to full citizenship for every person in the United States. This has to be
the articulated goal even as we, as realists, understand how difficult it will be to
achieve. Without sustained pressure in the political arena, such an objective will
never come to pass.
VI. POLICY PROPOSALS: DESEGREGATING OUR SCHOOLS,
NEIGHBORHOODS, AND COMMUNITIES
Given the deeply intractable nature of the residential and school segregation
that characterizes our metropolitan areas, there is no question it will require the
active participation of all levels of government, including the federal government,
to ameliorate this problem.' 9 My focus here, however, will be on actions that
should be taken by the states and their localities. First, as I have suggested, many
minority children experience systematic disadvantage because of the segregated
and inferior nature of our primary and secondary schools. Second, it is impossible
to de-couple racial segregation in our schools from racial segregation in our
neighborhoods. Third, because percentage plans are an inadequate remedy for
such systemic disadvantage, the state has an obligation to do more than provide
percentage plans to ameliorate the harms flowing from such disadvantage.
While I do not pretend to have all of the answers to this vexing problem, I
want to make several policy suggestions regarding efforts that states should
pursue to begin to ameliorate the disadvantage that is created by segregated
neighborhoods and segregated schools. These prescriptions borrow from the
excellent work done by Gary Orfield, Douglas Massey, Nancy Denton, Florence
Roisman, john powell, and many others who have recognized the profound
'9' See, e.g., Frank H.T. Rhodes, College by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1999, at
A19 (Percentage plans are a "route to expanding educational opportunity for underrepresented
minorities [that] should be avoided by any university that has better choices.").
194 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHrTS, supra note 5.
'9' See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95, at 217-18.
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relationship between our schools and our neighborhoods. These proposals grow
out of a fundamental belief that the most effective way to deliver quality
schooling to systematically disadvantaged minorities is to provide for
desegregated educational and housing opportunities.
As Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton have so eloquently urged, "the real choice
about the future is between accepting resegregation and finding a path toward
viable and lasting desegregation.' ' 196 The reality, however, is that given the levels
of minority concentration in our cities, and the fact that so many of our suburban
areas are predominantly White, it is unrealistic to believe that any meaningful
level of public school desegregation can occur without suburban assistance.'97
One might argue that the Supreme Court's 1974 Milliken v. Bradley'9" decision
would obstruct any attempt to utilize the suburbs to desegregate city schools.
Milliken, however, only tells us that notions of federalism dictate that the federal
courts may not force states to redraw school district lines or the suburbs to submit
to interdistrict busing in the absence of an interdistrict violation, not what the state
might volunteer to do freely.' 99
The fact that our large metropolitan areas have been (often artificially)
divided into many separate political entities and independent school districts
makes it difficult to even imagine a metropolitan response to the problem of
segregated and inferior public schools. However, such a coordinated response is
sorely needed.200 One possibility might be, as William Julius Wilson has
suggested, to consolidate urban and suburban areas, thereby creating a
"metropolitan government." 20' Such a government would have a shared tax base
and could engage in "collaborative metropolitan planning, and the creation of
regional authorities to develop solutions to common problems if communities fail
to reach agreement. '20 2 Ultimately, the state is responsible for creating discrete
196 See Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 331, 354.
'
97 See id. at 62-63 ("In 1986, the nation's twenty-five largest urban school districts served
only 3 percent of whites. In metropolitan Atlanta... 98 percent of the area's white high school
students attended suburban schools by 1986.").
"' 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
199 See id. at 752; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 97-98 (1995).
200 As Orfield and Eaton have argued, the most stable desegregation plans are plans that
include cities and suburbs. See Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 63-64. They add that such
desegregation plans are most useful because such plans:
[Increase stability by raising the costs of flight and creating better options for those who
stay. In such communities, high-status families have to be concerned about the schools
serving the poor since their children share the same schools. Business must care because
there is nowhere else to go for workers. Such plans create a vested area-wide interest in
success and they have the demographic stability needed to permit long-term efforts to
upgrade ....
Id. at 355.
201 WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 220 (1996).
202 Id.
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political subdivisions, drawing school district lines and for the provision of public
education itself.203 If the state has the power to draw school district lines, it can
also modify them voluntarily in order to achieve an important public goal such as
desegregating public schools and integrating regional housing markets.204 Once
this occurs it is easier to imagine a "metropolitan" response to a significant
region-wide problem in the same manner that we approach region-wide
transportation challenges or environmental harms.20 5 From this perspective, it is
easier to see individuals as inhabiting part of a shared community, as opposed to
inhabiting a world apart, and to see programmatic responses to segregated and
inferior education as unifying as opposed to trammeling sacrosanct district lines,
disrupting solid communities, and destroying neighborhood schools. 0 6
But what does it mean to advocate a metropolitan response? One answer is to
disaggregate the notion that a student, particularly a high school student, must
attend a neighborhood school. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways,
including redrawing school district lines so that more Black and Hispanic students
are eligible to attend predominantly White schools, because there is "nothing
sacrosanct about the current location of [school district] boundaries." 207 One
203 A state's power over its cities has been called "absolute." GERALD E. FRUG, CITY
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WiOuT BUILDING WALLS, 17 (1999). In Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907), the Supreme Court characterized the state's power with
respect to cities to include the ability to "expand or contract the territorial area." The
development of the doctrine of "home rule" has not altered this result. FRUG, supra at 17
("[M]ost state constitutions have been amended to grant cities the power to exercise 'home
rule.' But cities are free of state control under home rule only on matters purely local in nature.
And, nowadays, little if anything is sufficiently local to fall within such a definition of
autonomy."). Although most states delegate power to provide for a public education to a state
agency, school district, or some combination of both, the final responsibility for the provision of
public education remains with the state. This is certainly the case with respect to our percentage
plan states. In Florida, for all practical purposes, school districts are "agent[s] of the state." Op.
Fla. Att'y Gen. 069-12 (1969). In California, the state legislature retains power over local
school boards, and "the state ... has plenary powers in all school district affairs." Butt v. State,
842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Tinsley v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 91 Cal. App.
3d 871, 880-81 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979)). The situation in Texas is similar. Texas statutory law
defines school districts as "political subdivision[s]" that is, as "local government entit[ies]
created and operating under the laws of [the] state." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 191.003 (4)
(2000).
204 See generally John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair
Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1573 (1993) (advocating for a
centralized approach that would provide incentives for municipalities to create integrated
housing opportunities).
20 ee WILSON, supra note 201, at 220.206 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The city
of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs must be viewed as a single community. Detroit is closely
connected to its suburbs in many ways, and the metropolitan area is viewed as a single cohesive
unit by its residents.").
207 See FRUG, supra note 203, at 185 ("These boundary lines have long been relied on-
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possibility would be to re-draw school district lines so that racial and
socioeconomic integration was achieved. °8 In addition, states could also
liberalize transfer policies so that students could attend the school of their choice,
residence notwithstanding.0 9 States should insure not only that transfers are
freely available throughout the state to the school of a student's choice, but as
Orfield and Eaton have argued, states should also "provide the information
systems, the transportation, the counseling, and other elements needed to make
this [transfer] opportunity genuinely available to low-income segregated minority
families., 210 Perhaps most importantly, under no circumstance should a state
allow any transfer to take place that would increase segregation.2 1
Along similar lines, percentage plans themselves might well have
unappreciated benefits. In providing an early and insightful comment on Texas'
Ten Percent Plan, Professor David Orentlicher suggested that percentage plans
might create incentives to improve the quality of public schools and to enhance
racial diversity at the college and university level.212 His view was that a shift to a
percentage plan system removes a built-in advantage that many students who
attend "stronger" schools enjoy.213 From this perspective, parents seeking to
maximize their child's chances of attending a public college or university in a
percentage plan state would have an incentive to either relocate to a different
district or transfer their child to a "weaker" school, in effect betting that their child
would become a top student in a less competitive environment.214 Over time, this
would have beneficial spill-over effects: "[i]f parents adjusted their choices of
school districts, the wealthier and more influential among them would spread
their wealth and political influence over a wider range of schools."2 ' According
to Orentlicher, the increase in quality would then indirectly enhance minority
representation at state colleges and universities because "minority students would
and schools have been located-to ensure the separation of different kinds of students. They
could now be redrawn with the opposite result in mind.").
208 See MCUSIC, supra note 86, at 131.
209 See FRUG, supra note 203, at 187 (asserting that children should not be given a
preference to attend a school in a particular district simply because "their parents can[ ] afford to
buy a house nearby").
210 Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 355. Without such supports, unfettered school
choice may exacerbate rather than ameliorate racial segregation. See id. See generally Betsy
Levin, Race and School Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY 266 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
211 See Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 355. The history of "freedom of choice" plans
does not suggest that they will perform a desegregative function unless the governmental entity
involved takes affirmative steps to ensure that they necessarily will function in such a fashion.
See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,441-42 (1968).
212 See David Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas' Ten Percent Solution: Improving
Diversity and Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 181 (1998).
213 See id. at 190.
214 See id.
215 id.
177520011
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
be less disadvantaged by having to attend weak schools."216
It remains to be seen whether this will prove to be an unintended benefit of
percentage plans. It would be hugely advantageous if percentage plans could
effect the market such that school quality is improved and minority attendance at
public universities and colleges is enhanced.217 But the question is whether White
parents will so value the promise of admission to a state college or university that
they will relocate or transfer their child to a predominantly Black and/or Latino
high school such that meaningful desegregation of those schools might occur.2,I
Perhaps some number of them might. But it is unlikely that the incentives created
by percentage plans will, by themselves, significantly affect secondary school
segregation.219 This only reminds us of the fact that a variety of other factors must
also be altered in order to create meaningful change at the secondary school level,
that is, to desegregate our schools and our neighborhoods.220 Finally, even if
Orentlicher's prediction comes to pass (and I sincerely hope that it will), the irony
that percentage plans create remains.
What else can be done? School funding should not depend solely upon the
216 Id. at 191.
217 Early indications suggest, however, that parents are more willing to pressure schools to
engage in subterfuge to "pack" as many students as possible into the top ten percent, than to
relocate or transfer in order to game their child's chance of gaining automatic admission to a
state college or university. See Daniel Golden, Fudge Factor: Some High Schools Finagle to
Cram Kids into Top 10016 of Class, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2000, at Al (reporting that
"admissions rules based on class rank are susceptible to manipulation-particularly by the elite
high schools that stand to lose the most").
2" Evidence from perhaps the most prominent magnet program ever undertaken that was
intended to improve both the quality of inner-city schools and to desegregate them, suggests
that even where an extraordinary amount of money is spent on augmenting programs,
improving teaching, and enhancing facilities, that White families remain resistant to attending
predominately Black schools. See Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 241, 262 (evaluating the
Kansas City, Missouri Metropolitan School District magnet schools program and finding that:
"[w]ith respect to the second goal-attracting new white students into the district-it is hard to
judge the remedy a success").
219 It might be useful to analogize percentage plans to magnet schools on the theory that
each provides a kind of "carrot" to White parents. The results of magnet programs, however, do
not suggest a basis for optimism. Id. at 262 ("Magnets, when used alone, are simply not
powerful enough to overcome the economic and demographic trends that have increased the
racial isolation of the inner city.").
220 An emphasis on the incentives that percentage plans might create also raises other
problems because such incentives can cut both ways. Assuming that it is true that percentage
plans create incentives for private actors to engage in particular types of behaviors, a closely
related question is whether such plans also create disincentives for minority students to seek
desegregated educational environments at the high school level. After all, why should a
minority student either move to a more diverse neighborhood or seek to transfer to a more
integrated school if she reasonably believes that she would not be among the top graduates in
her new high school class?
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assessed value of the real property in a particular school district.221 Additional
state funding should be provided so that all school districts within a state receive
the same amount of funding per pupil, providing equal educational opportunity to
every student in the state.222 In making this assertion, however, I do not suggest
that equalizing school financing is an effective substitute for meaningful school
desegregation, but it is an important component of equal educational opportunity.
The predominant goal should be "racial and socioeconomic integration."
223
Given the interrelationship between schools and housing, the state must also
take affirmative steps to desegregate our neighborhoods and metropolitan areas.
There are a variety of avenues that the state might pursue in this regard. First, as
Massey and Denton have argued, an effort must be made to stem the
"institutionalized process of neighborhood racial turnover, which is the ultimate
mechanism by which the ghetto is reproduced and maintained., 224 One way to
begin this process is to enhance fair housing enforcement mechanisms. For
instance, states and localities should step up fair housing enforcement to prevent
discrimination by the real estate, financial, and insurance industries.22' Along
those lines, states should also strengthen the state and local agencies that process
many fair housing complaints.226
However, reliance on fair housing enforcement with its case-by-case
approach will not provide a systematic solution to the problem of residential
segregation.221 Instead, anti-residential discrimination efforts should be
systematic, affect entire metropolitan areas, and must also anticipate prospective
region-wide development and growth. As Orfield and Eaton remind us, it is
highly likely that there will be "vast growth of suburban minority school
enrollment in the next generation and massive movement of whites to outer
suburbs, but most suburbs have no experience and few tools for dealing with
segregation and racial transition." 228 States must have a plan that anticipates (and
hopefully controls) growth such that meaningful metropolitan-wide residential
integration can be assured.
More specifically, states should promote "inclusionary" zoning, the
221 See MCUSIC, supra note 86, at 98 ("Because no state draws its school district
boundaries to equalize the value of property in each district, districts are able to raise differing
amounts of money for their schools. Property-rich districts can finance abundantly with lower
property taxes; property-poor districts can provide inadequate finances even with high taxes.").
222 see id. at 99 ("[f]n no state does the supplemental funding actually eliminate spending
inequalities.").
223 See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249, 256 (1999).
224 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 95, at 229.
221 See Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 357.
226 See JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 221 (1995).
227 See Boger, supra note 204, at 1581-85 (explaining deficiencies of case-by-case
approach under the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
228 See Orfield & Eaton, supra note 84, at 357.
17772001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
"construction of affordable housing in places where it otherwise would not be
built., 229 If necessary, the states can achieve this end by overriding the interests of
municipalities in pursuing exclusionary zoning policies.23° States should also
provide for increased funding for the development of affordable housing in areas
that deconcentrate poverty and race through state housing finance agencies.231
Along these lines, one possibility that states should consider is the adoption on the
state level of John Charles Boger's "National Fair Share Act" proposal that would
stimulate residential integration on a metropolitan scale. 32 Boger's proposal
imagined a federal statute, based loosely on New Jersey's Mount Laurel
experience, that created an incentive for municipalities to meet goals of providing
for racially and economically integrated housing on pain of withdrawal of those
municipalities' federal mortgage interest and property tax deductions.233 The
central genius of Boger's proposal is that it recognizes the importance of
centralized planning while at the same time undercutting the effects of
exclusionary zoning. Under Boger's proposal, the appropriate state agency was
directed to "calculate the extent of residential segregation and of low-income
housing need in each region [of the state] and... to assign to each municipality a
fair share of the ascertained regional need. ' 234 Using the Boger plan as a model,
states might designate integration and affordable housing goals on a region-wide
basis that each municipality, particularly developing municipalities and suburban
areas, would then be required to meet.235
The states should also institute housing mobility strategies because the
"concentration of minority households in poor neighborhoods has become one of
the most dramatic features of residential segregation." 236 As the federal housing
229 Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URi. L.J. 23, 26 (1996).See Florence Wagman Roisman, Sustainable Development in Suburbs and Their
Cities: The Environmental and Financial Imperatives of Racial, Ethnic, and Economic
Inclusion, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87,115-16 (1998).
211 See Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity
and Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOwA L. REv. 479, 522 (1995)
(reviewing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)); Michael H. Schill, Race, the Underclass, and
Public Policy, 19 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 433,452 (1994) (same).232 See Boger, supra note 204.233 See id. at 1573-74.
234 Id. at 1603-04.
235Indeed, California currently requires that each county and city develop a
comprehensive plan with a "housing element." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c) (1999).
Consequently, each local government must create a plan that complies with a "regional fair-
share housing allocation" that "seek[s] to reduce the concentration of lower income households
in cities or counties which already have disproportionately high proportions of lower income
households." W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA 37 (1994); see CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65584(a) (1999).
236 YINGER, supra note 226, at 234. For an early and insightful examination of the
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program has shifted from a project-based program to one that provides portable
housing subsidies directly to the recipient that can be used throughout a
metropolitan area to secure rental housing in the private market, the possibilities
for deconcentrating race and poverty have increased.237 While a "section 8"
housing subsidy can help a recipient secure housing in a less racially and
economically impacted area, additional supports are necessary to facilitate
integrative moves.238 States can do much to enhance the ability of this program to
achieve desegregation. For instance, states can provide information about
integrated housing opportunities to recipients contemplating moves and improve
funding for adequate childcare and transportation to recipients once they have
relocated to suburban areas.239 Finally, because perceptions of discrimination and
harassment in some neighborhoods often deters section 8 recipients from
engaging in desegregative moves, states should redouble their efforts to fight
housing discrimination generally, and discrimination against section 8 recipients
specifically.24 °
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent adoption of percentage plans in three of the most populous states
in the union-California, Florida, and Texas-highlight a compelling moment in
the American struggle to achieve the promise of equal opportunity for all. These
percentage plans are emblematic of the ironies embedded in our post-affirmative
action era: they were conceived of as a means to secure some racial diversity in
public higher education, while avoiding unfashionable and constitutionally
possibilities that housing mobility strategies hold for deconcentrating race and poverty see,
Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and Life Opportunities, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 335 (1993). See generally, LEONARD S. RuBINOwrrz & JAMES E.
ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE
SUBURBIA (2000); HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILrrY (G. Thomas Kingsley &
Margery Austin Turner eds., 1993); HOUSING MOBILITY: PROMISE OR ILLUSION? (Alexander
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problematic race-conscious preferential affirmative action. In this article, I probe
the central irony of these plans: they can only succeed in achieving racial diversity
in higher education if educational institutions at the lower levels remain
segregated. The irony is intensified when we remember that the very states that
now institute percentage plans were key actors in creating the residential and
educational segregation that those plans rely upon for their effectiveness.
This paradoxical situation, at first glance, seems like an infinite loop or an
unsolvable puzzle. Progressives and civil rights advocates have reacted by
proffering two arguments: restore race-conscious preferential affirmative action,
or adjust race-neutral affirmative action so that the overall number of minorities in
higher education is not reduced. While I do not disagree with either of these
positions, I believe that the inquiry must go deeper and the goals must be loftier.
The fundamental question, I believe, is this: can percentage plans, which embody
governmental acknowledgement of the systematic disadvantage created by
segregated, inferior secondary schools, adequately remedy that disadvantage?
When we unpack the baggage embedded in percentage plans, this is what we
see: that the state recognizes the systemic segregation that still abides in primary
and secondary education today, and the state sees that this systemic segregation
disadvantages minorities. Layered upon this is the traditional American notion
that government should guarantee an equal playing field upon which all comers
can attempt to achieve the American dream, unhindered by prejudice based on
race, color, or creed. Given this, the spotlight should be the nature of the
obligation that is conferred upon the state as a result of this confluence of
circumstances.
While current Supreme Court jurisprudence may not confer an obligation
upon the state to address this reality under the United States Constitution, I argue
that a profound and compelling obligation is created nonetheless. The political
conversation regarding percentage plans, I believe, is narrow: the left is
constricted by the incremental judicial erosion of affirmative action, and the right
more resolute than ever in its belief that. to take race into account in any manner is
a constitutional violation of the most significant magnitude. I believe we must
move the tenor of the conversation to another level. In the current environment,
percentage plans may seem like a quick fix to achieve a certain metrics for
minority representation in public institutions of higher learning. But until we
address the segregated and inferior education received by many minority children,
which is in turn intertwined with persistent residential segregation, percentage
plans will never address more than the tip of the iceberg. If we turn our backs on
this task, we risk abandoning the promise of equal educational opportunity for all
Americans.
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